

France 4707

Personnel

Note
sur certains agents de la propagande allemande en France
Marcel Ribardiére

Nous avons connu un homme qui nous semblait seulement un ambitieux et un agité, mais qui nous apparaît maintenant sous un jour différent à la lueur des événements.

Marcel Ribardiére était avocat-agréé au Tribunal de Commerce de Paris. Bon avocat d'affaires, habile à dénouer les situations commerciales difficiles et à tirer les sociétés faillies des mauvais pas dans lesquels elles avaient succombé, il s'est d'abord occupé uniquement de sa profession et y a réalisé une importante fortune.

Sa femme, belge, avait comme lui-même le goût de la dépense et de l'ostentation et les époux commençaient par rechercher l'éclat social. Appartement princier à Paris, sur le Palais-Royal; la propriété historique des Granges de Port-Royal, où vivaient jadis les "solitaires" et où l'on retrouve intacte la chambre et la bibliothèque de Racine; une somptueuse villa à Cannes; le tout permettant de recevoir le Tout-Paris élégant.

Puis l'ambition amena Ribardiére à poser une candidature à la Chambre des Députés dans son Pays d'origine, le Pottou. Mais il fut battu et renonça à la faveur populaire.

Il se prit au goût des voyages, des affaires internationales, et comprit l'influence qu'un homme d'affaires expérimenté, grand voyageur et fortune pouvait acquérir en faisant le "Figaro" politique entre les hommes d'Etat des différents pays en jeu diplomatiques.

Son éclectisme l'amena successivement en Russie, au Japon, ainsi qu'en Belgique; en Allemagne et en Italie. Il profita de ses voyages pour se faire présenter au plus grand nombre possible de gens importants, près desquels il apparaissait comme le confident informé et puissant de la politique française. Et à son retour il rendait visite aux hommes politiques français en se disant au contraire près d'eux l'interprète des confidences, des souhaits et des amitiés des hommes d'Etat étrangers qu'il avait rencontrés.

Jusque là, le jeu pouvait paraître innocent. Mais peu à peu Ribardiére devint plus actif. Ses relations se concentrèrent sur l'Allemagne et l'Italie. Par occasion peut-être, il fut appelé à plaider pour Hitler le procès auquel avait donné lieu la publication en France de "Mein Kampf". Ses relations allemandes se développèrent rapidement et brillamment,

et il put organiser des dîners et des réceptions dans les
quelles de hautes personnalités allemandes purent rencontrer
les hommes politiques français. Par ailleurs il réussit
d'échanger des relations culturelles d'aspect inoffensif
inoffensif entre des jeunes gens des deux pays. Il fût par
acquis à Paris un grand journal du soir, "l'Internationale",
où il soutenait la politique du Ministre des Affaires
Étrangères, Georges Bonnet.

Bref, ce Ribardière était devenu un agent secret de la
politique de rapprochement avec le Reich hitlerien.

Son ambition naïve, son caractère agité, nous avaient
fait penser qu'il agissait surtout par vanité et dans le désir
de jouer un rôle. Il était convaincu que les anciens combat-
tants dont il présidait l'une des associations, franchissaient
un jour la direction des affaires publiques et il poursuivait
le rêve de devenir en leur nom le Ministre des Affaires
Étrangères de France.

Il y avait certainement de tout cela dans son cas. Et
c'est en cela qu'il nous a semblé intéressant; car il parvenait
de montrer une fois de plus comment la vertu de la propagande
ennemie réussit à s'infiltrer par les moyens les plus divers
et comment, entre la complète innocence et la trahison cynique,
on peut saisir les formes et les degrés les plus variés de
sottise ou de culpabilité.

Notre cas d'aujourd'hui est typique: un bourgeois fortuné,
certainement à mille lieux de toute défiance nationale ou
débile, mais vaniteux et léger, qui se laisse progressivement
entraîner dans des voies blâmables qu'il aurait dû la première
à répudier à l'origine. Il a été incontestablement un centre
d'activité non négligeable en faveur de l'Allemagne. Et son
attitude actuelle nous amène à penser qu'il y a peut-être
même eu davantage. En effet, il n'a pas attendu un mois,
après l'armistice, pour réaliser un accord avec les autorités
occupantes pour la réapparition de son journal, dont le person-
nel a été purgé et dont le principal inspirateur est maintenant
l'un des anciens rédacteurs, qui est un confident et un partisan
effréné de Pierre Laval.

Note
Sur certains agents de la propagande allemande en France
Marcel Knecht

Parmi les personnages éminents de la propagande en faveur de l'Allemagne, qu'il nous a été donné d'observer, l'un des plus caractéristiques est Marcel Knecht, Secrétaire Général du journal "Le Matin". Celui-ci a certainement joué un rôle efficace, par l'activité et l'astuce de ses méthodes, par son génie personnel de l'intrigue et de l'information, par l'étendue et le choix de ses relations.

Knecht est un homme d'aspect lourd, en réalité très intelligent, parlant très aisément l'Allemand et l'Anglais aussi bien que le Français, et d'une activité extraordinaire.

Ses champs d'action étaient multiples. En premier lieu, il était de ce groupe de collaborateurs du "Matin" qui avaient accepté de n'être pas seulement les professionnels du journalisme, mais plus encore les serviteurs personnels du "patron", M. Vanilla. Celui-ci est un vieillard original, vaniteux et autoritaire, qui se flatte de ne parler de Clemenceau qu'en disant "Cet canaille de Clemenceau", ou de Lloyd George comme "Cet imbécile de Lloyd George", et à qui sa fortune et son journal permettaient de recevoir à sa table toutes les sommités politiques. Il avait une marotte -- entre autres -- qui était la haine du communisme, à laquelle il rapportait toutes ses attitudes politiques. Rien n'était plus facile à un homme insinuant comme Knecht que de flatter les passions de "patron" et de l'amener à penser et à agir dans le sens désiré.

Or, non seulement le "Matin" n'a cessé depuis des années de mener campagne contre tout accord avec la Russie et en faveur de tout rapprochement avec l'Allemagne et l'Italie. Mais il a été l'un des premiers, après la défaite, à accepter la direction allemande et à soutenir chaudement la collaboration. Jean Luchaire, que nous avons récemment décrit comme l'agent le plus misérable de l'Allemagne, est devenu le Rédacteur en Chef de ce journal allemand de Paris.

Knecht avait un second terrain d'action également dangereux. Il est Lorrain et avait de nombreuses relations en Alsace et en Lorraine. Il a fréquenté des autonomistes et a réussi à présenter quelques-uns d'entre eux sous des apparences patriotiques qui les rendaient dangereux. L'auteur de cette note a le souvenir d'un certain abbé très recommandé à ses services pour une distinction honorifique et introduit près de lui-même, et dont le passé autonomiste lui fut ensuite révélé. Ce prêtre doit être aujourd'hui retourné à Strasbourg et y manifester des sentiments conformistes envers les autorités allemandes.

- 2 -

Enfin Knecht recueillait des informations précieuses et comportait une propagande insinuante par des méthodes personnelles.

Dans l'appartement qu'il occupait à l'hôtel Continental, il organisait des dîners de forme joyeuse et d'apparence anodine, où, comme nous l'avons exposé dans une note générale, il recevait des sortes de convives, les complices et les dupes.

Des hommes importants, ou plus fréquemment les intimes de ces hommes, étaient invités et discrètement amenés à des confidences en face d'eux se trouvaient d'autres invités qui expriment les idées que l'on désire leur voir adopter et répandre.

Un autre procédé, plus pittoresque, était également mis en oeuvre. Knecht avait recruté de jeunes femmes, qu'il appointait lui-même, en plus des salaires qu'elles pouvaient obtenir de leurs clients. Et il conseillait à ses amis et visiteurs ce remarquable moyen de demeurer jeunes, pour des hommes surmenés par le travail intellectuel. Lorsque l'interlocuteur semblait convaincu, Knecht lui offrait une de ses masquers et pénétrait ainsi dans l'intimité de personnages consulaires dont il obtenait aisément des informations indiscrètes.

On voyait chez lui, comme commensaux habituels, une dame Solvay, d'une grande famille belge, qui partageait son temps entre la France et l'Allemagne, et venait aussi en Amérique; le jeune député, comte de Beaumont, ami de René Saint-Cyr, dont l'activité en Italie a été suspecte, et qui, lui-même, a aujourd'hui à Paris l'un des salons les plus pro-allemands; le député Gaston Riou, sans doute plus imprudent et bavard que conscient; on y voyait, et cela est plus troublant encore, la comtesse de Portes, maîtresse de Paul Reynaud.

Et lorsqu'on rapproche cette constatation du rôle néfaste joué par cette malheureuse femme, aujourd'hui dévouée à la suite d'un troublant accident auto, dans les événements tragiques de Juin 1940, on éprouve un grand doute. Reynaud, quant à lui, était d'une indiscutable bonne foi, mais d'une lamentable faiblesse dans les mains de cette femme. Était-elle seulement un instrument inconscient aux reins de Knecht qui exploitait son ambition pour son amant et son agitation brouillonne? Était-elle subconsciemment avertie du rôle qu'on l'appelait à jouer? Il est certain en tous cas que Knecht n'ignorait rien de ses pensées et des espoirs de Reynaud et que, à tout le moins, il trouvait une source exceptionnelle de renseignements essentiels sur la politique de la France.

Nous ne savons pas ce qu'est actuellement devenue Marcel Knecht. Il était encore à Vichy lorsque nous en sommes partis à la fin de l'été 1940. Il est permis de supposer qu'il a repris sa place à Paris au "Matin", et dans l'entourage de Bureau-Varilla, à moins qu'il ait été appelé à un plus haut destin.



Colonel Donovan

2/10/42

This all active office memorandum
will give you an idea of how
our work is developing. I hope
we may have some comments and
directions.

KCP

FROM: DEWITT C. POOLE

March 10, 1942
Held

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

At a staff meeting this morning Mr. Poole announced that foreign political activities in the United States would be studied and reported upon in accordance with the following distribution of responsibility, until further notice:

Reynolds: Greek, Italian, Albanian, Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, French (Heckscher), Belgian (Heckscher), Spanish (Petrullo), Portuguese (Petrullo), Basque.

Petrullo: (Spanish), (Portuguese), Mexican and all other Latin American.

Heckscher: Austrian, Hungarian, Rumanian, (French), (Belgian).

Gold: Czech, Slovak, Carpatho-Ruselian.

Bowman: Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, (German).

Howland: Irish

Poole: (These to be distributed to others as the staff is enlarged) -- German (Bowman), Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Turkish, and the Near Eastern nationalities, including the Zionist Jews; also the Far Eastern nationalities.

Rohman: Consultant on labor aspect of all the foregoing; also Socialism and Communism.

Wilson: Liaison.

Canby: Indexing.

- 2 -

Mr. Poole explained that the responsibility of the staff for their respective assignments should not be thought of in terms, primarily, of the preparation of such reports and memoranda as would be specifically called for from time to time. Rather, reports and memoranda should be thought of as by-products of a more fundamental operation or duty. That duty, in the case of each staff member, was to possess at every moment a complete familiarity with the foreign political situations (nationality groups in the United States) assigned to him. If knowledge were thus kept current and complete, the staff would then be able to answer particular questions without delay and to prepare reports and memoranda on short order.

Knowledge of each assigned situation, Mr. Poole then went on to say, could not be limited to the data which happened to be in the files of the Branch at any given moment. The obligation of preparedness went far beyond this. It called for a familiarity with the whole subject as it actually existed at any moment. Asked about a particular point or phase of a given situation, it would not be sufficient for a staff member to answer: "We have no information in that respect." There was a responsibility on any one who had been assigned one or more situations to make sure that the pertinent data on hand were at all times as complete as it was possible to have them. Uncovered spots in each situation must be looked for and notes submitted to the Director of the Branch specifying additional

- 8 -

information needed so that appropriate action might be taken in order to supply all deficiencies. When some particular information was found not to be on hand when requested, the question would be put "Why not"? There would have to be a satisfactory explanation.

Naturally (Mr. Poole continued) all the information in every situation could not be gathered into the Branch's own particular files. When information was not directly at hand, the responsible person must know where it could be most readily obtained - as, for example, in the Special Defense Unit of the Justice Department.

Responsibility on the part of the Branch and its workers to see that information on each situation was as complete as practicable at any given moment suggested in turn (Mr. Poole continued) the need for some sort of standard outline for reports. Standard outlines would need to be developed as the work progressed; they should be subject to constant alteration and improvement. The following was suggested as a beginning.

Standard Analysis or Outline of a Foreign
Political Situation in the United States

(Introductory summary of the whole report, never to exceed 200 words in length.)

I. More tangible features of the situation

A. The foreign base or source

Main points, very briefly summarized, regarding the recent political history and present position of the country, or ethnic region, of origin.

B. Number and distribution of nationality in the United States

" 4 "

1. Resident aliens
2. Those in process of becoming citizens
3. Citizens
4. Economic position and resources

II. More intangible features

- A. General social situation and political disposition, by categories, of those in the United States
- B. Their present organization
 1. Benevolent societies, trade unions, etc.
 2. Political organization
 - a. Ostensible
 - b. Real
- C. Personalities

III. Concrete political grievances and aspirations; current activities

IV. The interest of the United States

- A. Dangers to the American interest
 1. Actual
 2. Potential
- B. Supports to the American interest
 1. Actual
 2. Potential
- C. Possible courses of action on the part of the American authorities (a systematic presentation of alternatives without explicit recommendations.)

Mr. Poole appointed Messrs. Reynolds, Heckscher and Canby a committee to study the problem of standard outlines and to make recommendations.

- 5 -

Messrs. Howland, Bowman and Gold were appointed a committee to study office organization and procedure and make recommendations respecting standard practices.

DeWitt C. Poole

TO:

Chen
.....COLONEL. DONOVAN.....

February 13, 1946

For whatever interest it may
present. The correspondent
is Aklivisson. Please return
this to me.

John C. Wiley
FROM: JOHN C. WILEY

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION - West. Branch, Building
 COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: D. C. Poole
 TO: Mr. John C. Wiley
 SUBJECT:

DATE February 13, 1948

A newspaper correspondent referred in conversation today to one or more articles which were published in the Washington Daily News about seven weeks ago under the name of Evelyn Petyon Gordon, a social columnist. These articles related to the Archduke Otto of Austria and were deprecatory in tone purporting to show that Otto had at first moved among the most respectable elements in Washington and then had rather quickly descended the social ladder.

The newspaper correspondent in question expressed the view that these articles had been inspired by the Reverend Joseph Cod, a Jesuit priest thought to be of Irish background, with whom Otto was at one time intimate. Father Cod, according to the newspaper correspondent in question, lives in an ample way and strives to maintain a political salon. He was previously pro-Franco and he is if correct anti-Communist. It was reported at one time that the Empress Zita would come to the United States and live in Father Cod's house in Arlington and that Father Cod would be the Royal Chaplain.

100


100

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William L. Langer
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: NOTE ON THE "FACT OF FOUR"

DATE February 20, 1942

Thank you for allowing me to see the
attached material on the "FACT OF FOUR".
I must confess that I find almost nothing
in it that is not generally known to
people concerned with such matters.


William L. Langer
Director of Research

Attachment

TO:

Dr. Langer
~~COLONEL DONOVAN~~

return to

Feb. 17, 1948

The attached is another contribution from our friend on the subject of the Four Power Pact and its antecedents. It might be worth routing on to Dr. Langer and his collaborators.

me
FROM: JOHN C. WILBY

pleased him to see a committee set up between his country and the three greatest European nations which was to lay down the law to the smaller nations. The equality between the small and the powerful nations at Geneva annoyed him. Also, he was a "revisionist" and hoped to profit from the concessions which would have to be made to Germany in order to obtain some for Italy. Finally, in view of his domestic policy, he felt himself able to play the part of arbiter between the democratic countries and Hitlerian Germany.

The British government, always ready for appeasement, saw in this proposal the double hope of assuring themselves the friendship of Italy and finding a way to impose on Europe transactions which they hoped would consolidate the peace. These transactions were not possible through the intermediary of Geneva because of the resistance of the small nations who knew in advance that they would be the victims.

Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Simon came to Rome March 18, 1938, and began negotiations which should have terminated by the signature of the pact on the following June 7th. Germany naturally had everything to gain by this pact and nothing to lose.

As for France, she was drawn into this policy in spite of a lively opposition by men the best qualified for a diversity of reasons. Edouard Daladier, who had just become President of the Council for the first time, was influenced by Fernand de Brinon, (already in agreement with the Nazis) and Henry de Jouvenel, a great gentleman with a vigorous spirit, whose authoritative ideas did not favor the negative procedures of Geneva and who, in his capacity of Ambassador, prided himself in misleading and holding back Mussolini.

chief, Edouard Herriot, a supporter of the League of Nations and the small states.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Boncour, a very faithful adherent of the League, but weak and much affected by the opinion of the British Government, rallied to the cause which his Geneva conviction would certainly have made him reject for different reasons; the assurance of Jouvenel, of whom he was an intimate friend, and because of the brutal authority of the President of the Council.

*

* *

In the light of these facts, this pact, which raised heated controversies in France, was a grave mistake. From the point of view of moral principles on which the League of Nations was founded, the pact deserves to be blamed since it suppressed equality between sovereign nations and in practice in no way helped to solve the problems. It only made the differences between the Great Chancelleries more acute. In fact, France, who kept her friends and protected her eventual allies, could not consent to let them be made a prey and the result of the pact was to give to France alone the responsibility of refusing all the revision request which affected her allies. These countries, especially Poland and the States of the Little Entente, were nonetheless worried and hurt by the pact.

In brief, the pact, which could have had at least practical results if its promoters had been in agreement on certain arrangements of Europe and if there had been but one way to impose its acceptance on the reluctant Nations, was not even put into effect. The "Club des Charcutiers" (Butchers' Club), as Eugene Lautier wittily called it, never assembled and its theoretical creation had no other consequence but to provoke great disappointment and

Moreover, it hinged like all the acts of concession imposed by Great Britain from 1933 to 1939 on an illusion. They naively believed that a Hitlerian dictator, who had warned the world in his famous book, could all of a sudden become a Chief of State made wise by his success and inclined to turn pacifist and conservative because of a few advantages offered him. Elementary psychology and the Nazi activity should have made them understand sooner that Hitler's dynamic personality would lead him to increase his demands more and more, since he was only encouraged by weakness. Therefore, there was no other way to curb him except by offering opposition in the form of armament policy and by making alliances which would have made them superior in strength.

TO:

COLONEL DORTCHMAN

Feb. 16, 1942

The attached is from our
mutual friend and has several
points of considerable interest
in respect of the British at-
titude before the Anschluss.


FROM: JOHN G. WILEY

The culminating point of the concession policy before Hitler's threats was obviously the Munich pact.

However, it is understandable that the Democratic Governments, at that time, hesitated to take the responsibility of entering into the impending war.

In our opinion, another less important and less known event paved the way for Munich by making it clear to Hitler that the way lay open to any audacity he undertook. This fact reveals even more the state of mind of British statesmen because it was a spontaneous action which no outward circumstance made necessary.

We are speaking of the visit Lord Halifax, at that time Lord President of the Council, paid to Hitler in November, 1937.

This visit naturally had been decided by the British Cabinet, chiefly by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Who were these two leaders of Britain's foreign policy? Pacifist Neville Chamberlain was Prime Minister, but Anthony Eden, one of the most symbolic representatives, in current opinion, of the resistance policy, was Secretary of Foreign Affairs. This confirms a theory which we have already expounded, namely that it is arbitrary to classify statesmen in definite categories when in reality the development of events and the hazards of their careers places them first in one frame of mind and then another.

However, on November 17, 1937, Lord Halifax went to pay a visit - an official visit, it was said - to Hitler, with a view to sounding his intentions and finding a basis for an entente which would insure a durable peace in Europe.

This conversation, as should have been expected, was disappointing to the English pacifists. Hitler merely made demands and offered nothing. He complained that he had been dispossessed

natural extension of Germany. To this end he demanded liberty of action in the east. This was the policy which he has always expounded in his writings and speeches and that he has begun to apply, and at this moment is attempting to complete.

#

* *

After this voyage a conference was arranged in London between the French and the English. It took place in December, 1937. This date is important because it closely preceded the Anschluss and probably the feeling of England's weakness facilitated Hitler's decision.

On the English side, the participants were Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax, assisted by Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. On the French side were M. Camille Chautemps and M. Delbos, assisted by M. Alexis Leger, Secretary General of Foreign Affairs. The minutes of this exchange of views which lasted two days would be easy to obtain from the French Office of Foreign Affairs and probably also from the English Foreign Office.

Lord Halifax gave a complete account of his interview with the Reichskanzler and also his impressions which were not good. Then the Ministers examined future events which were likely to threaten peace. They sought to determine if it would be opportune to attempt appeasing the German dictator by making important propositions and if so, what were they to be.

In order briefly to summarize the results of this conference we shall emphasize only the following two points.

The opposition of the French was firm with regard to any policy which would abandon the central and eastern European nations, inevitably leading to rapid German domination of Europe

Therefore the Ministers examined the possibility of giving back to Germany her colonies in return for a guarantee of the European status quo.

With regret, for they had no faith in Hitler's word and were not even sure that he would accept such a deal, the French Ministers consented to enter upon a study of these views in order to keep their agreement with England and on the double condition that the sacrifice which would eventually be required of the French should be compensated by positive guarantees of peace in Europe and that these sacrifices should be made by England as well as France.

The latter point embarrassed the English who believed it impossible for them to give up their mandated colonies. It was even suggested by the British - and later denied by common accord when the press made mention of it - that certain exchanges might be negotiated, for example with ^{the} Belgian Congo.

2. From this moment on the English policy was confirmed as far as the fate of Central Europe was concerned. The situation with regard to Austria is already wellknown. Great Britain and France were not united by any special treaty other than the general League of Nations pact. The English Ministers announced that it was impossible for them to consider any form of intervention. Therefore, the Anschluss was actually an accomplished fact from that moment on.

A more enlightening fact is that the English decision with regard to Czechoslovakia was the same from that day on. However, this position was much more delicate. In fact, France was pledged to uphold Czechoslovakia and was entitled to expect similar action from Russia. In this event it seemed difficult to England to remain disinterested from a war on the European continent in which

attitude. It was not a question of personal weakness on the part of "the men of Munich" as is said today. It was Mr. Eden who said the following: "You must say to yourselves that there is not an Englishman who would agree to go to war for the sake of Czechoslovakia".

The French Ministers only obtained that the British Cabinet, in order not to encourage German aggressiveness, would take steps in Berlin to attempt to curb Hitler's expansion desire by giving assurances that England could not remain disinterested to the fates of the nations which Hitler would eventually threaten. However, it was expressly stated that the English did not intend any diplomatic manifestation and one should not count on any military intervention from them.

We believe it useful to mention this little known but actually very important conference. We do not think it is an exaggeration to say that it throws a new light on the events of recent years and on the respective responsibilities of the Governments involved.

January 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN:

An Austrian citizen who has been doing some work for us has expressed the following rather interesting ideas respecting the military situation which we shall confront in Europe when the Nazi regime breaks down. His ideas are based upon nearly twenty years of close observation of the Nazi phenomenon.


The military situation when the Nazi collapse comes will be essentially different from that which existed in 1918. Then the German High Command and the Kaiser gave up and were glad to save their necks. The proletarian masses were in the hands of Social-Democratic leaders who were essentially peaceful and bourgeois. The will to continue resistance was slight. That developed only later.

Now it is to be expected, not only that Hitler will fight to the bitter end, but that the sober brains of Himmler and Goebbels will have foreseen and executed all necessary steps for the event of a military defeat. Underground party organizations will already be formed and working. The forces of occupation and the new native governments will have to comb the country for Nazis. There will be guerilla fighting to the last and over a protracted period.

When the forces of occupation march through Germany,

-2-


Austria and parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia, they will receive a hot welcome. In organizing natives to fight on their side the political emigrants should be excluded. They consist up to 95 per cent at least of intellectuals with a restricted fighting value. Moreover, the emigration has no popularity and few contacts at home. The new successful leaders in the Central European countries will come from the concentration camps and prisons. The shock-troops will emerge from the mutineering parts of the army.



John C. Wiley

to: Col. Donovan -

Since Don Sturzo
seems to have the
clearest concept of
the Italian situation, ^{fall}
you may be interested
in the attached bio-
graphical data on
him. Please return
to -



FROM: JOHN O. WILBY



SECRET

To: John Willey
From: Gaudens Magare

Subject: Biographical sketch of Don Luigi Sturzo

Don Luigi Sturzo, Italian priest, social worker and political organizer, was born in 1870 or 1871 at Caltagirone, Sicily. Early in life he became a priest, and began his teaching career, teaching literature at the seminary of Caltagirone and also directing the seminary's Schola Cantorum, and aiming, to use his own words, "to obtain a chair in philosophy in one of Italy's universities". He was deeply impressed and "captivated" by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), the foundation stone of modern Christian democratic movements within the Catholic Church.

Although for a time Don Sturzo chose to pursue his philosophical avocation rather than political activities, and consequently, attended the Thomistic Academy and the Gregorian University in Rome, he eventually, during the '90's, devoted much of his energies to Catholic social activities, primarily in Sicily. He organized a Catholic ~~and~~ Diocesan Committee, workers', farmers' and students' associations; he ~~became~~ became an enthusiastic disciple of G. Tomiolo, an Italian apostle of "Christian Democracy"; and he founded a weekly, *La Croce di Costantino*. He continued to teach, however, becoming professor of philosophy and sociology at the Episcopal Seminary of Caltagirone, and registering in the University of Catania in Sicily, where he hoped to begin his university teaching career.

About 1902, as he interested himself in peasant strikes and movements for social reform, he began to devote virtually all his attention to politics. In 1905, he was elected mayor of Caltagirone, and, in the provincial assembly, he became the leader of the opposition against the socialist majority. About 1914 or '15 he was mayor of Caltagirone, vice-president of the Italian Communes Association, and general secretary of the Central Committee of "Catholic Action".

In January, 1919, he founded and became general secretary of the Partito Popolare Italiano, one of the most powerful political movements in the history of united Italy.

- 2 -

The advent of totalitarian fascism broke the power of Don Sturzo and his party. About 1925 or '26, apparently at the instance of the Vatican, Don Sturzo left Italy and settled in England. Although he engaged mostly in literary activity, he kept in close touch with the Italian political world in Italy and abroad. In 1936 he was perhaps the most influential organizer of "People and Freedom", a movement in England intended to propagate the point of view of democratic Catholics. A magazine with that name contains writings by Don Sturzo, and it is worth reading regularly.

In October, 1940, Don Sturzo came to this country apparently because war conditions in England were too disturbing and because he was in delicate health. He has heart trouble and is now living at St. Vincent's Hospital, Jacksonville, Florida.

Don Sturzo is still deeply interested in the Italian political situation and is still an important figure in the Italian political world. He is the author of many works on politics, history and sociology and is now engaged in elaborating his sociological theories.

Gaudens Megaro

Secret
Mr. Col. Donoran

We are
beginning to get
some where with
our little
playmate.

John
FROM: JOHN C. WILBY

To understand the sequence of historic events, it is useful to know the character of the men involved. This is quite specially the case with regard to French policy since the Franco-German Armistice.

Besides the characters which should be studied are very different and this also explains the hesitancy and contradictions of the policy.

Certain leaders in France at present, a few in Vichy but more especially those living in Paris in close connection with the Germans, were already converted to Fascist ideas before the war; some because of doctrinal aberration, others through blind sectarian hatred of Democracy and lastly the ambitious and opportunists.

On the other hand, some of Marshal Pétain's collaborators, like himself, had no preconceived political ideas, at least in regard to foreign policy. They submitted to collaboration with Germany rather than desired it and often tried to limit and delay it.

Between the two extremes there exists a category of politicians, without doctrine and without character, who plunged into the new policy which they had never previously considered, for the sole purpose of profiting by the political changes to place themselves better and further their career with the present regime as they had formerly done with the opposite regime.

Without a doubt Admiral Darian belongs to the last category.

Nothing in his past indicates his adherence to the totalitarian theories, for he was the constant favorite of the democratic regime, in which, although he was doubtless sometimes criticized, he evidently felt at ease.

His father was in politics but occupied only secondary positions. He was a man of moderate opinions who was once Minister of Justice towards the end of the last century, in 1897, that is to say when the future Admiral was about sixteen or seventeen.

This honorable "Garde des Sceaux" (Guardian of the Seals) left no blazing trail in the history of the Third Republic. However he came from a region of France which has produced several influential men in politics, especially the President of the Republic, Fallières. The young naval officer always made the most of the precious support which the memory of his father afforded him.

As far as a heretic can judge, he seems to have shown real qualities of intelligence and technical ability. His privileged career often brought him into the Ministerial Cabinets of the Rue Royale. His promotions were doubtless aided by this for he attained the highest ranks in the navy while still quite a young man.

Having become Chief of Staff of the French Navy, he collaborated especially with Georges Leygues, a Minister of great merit, who had dedicated himself, after a brilliant and varied career, to the reconstruction of the French fleet which had been neglected for some time. It would be unjust not to acknowledge that Admiral Darian accomplished an important task under Leygues' direction.

by Darlan under the authority of successive Ministers, D'Albert and Sarraut in particular and at the outbreak of the war, the fleet was in a very satisfactory condition.

It is important not to lose sight of this fact at present; taking into account of course, the limitations resulting from international conventions and financial possibilities, the French fleet is still an important weapon and it is essential that it should not be surrendered to the Germans. Let us add that in our opinion, we do not believe such a surrender possible.

Darlan, as Chief of the French Navy, held a choice position in the country. He enjoyed important material and moral advantages, was constantly consulted by the different governments and was highly considered in society.

His personality contributed to his social standing. He is thick set, keen eyed and has a ruddy complexion as if he had never left his ship, smokes a pipe and uses decided and often truculent language; he gives the superficial observer the illusion of being a character.

Why did this man, favored and pampered by the republican regime, who had attained what he should logically have considered the maximum in a naval career, afterwards become bitter and hostile to the regime in which he was born and had carried him to the top of the military and social hierarchy?

Secretly he may have nourished conservative feelings but he was obviously at ease with the regime and certainly was not involved, before the war, in the cabals, agita-

tions of all kinds to which business men, people in society and even officers were addicted. At any rate, men in politics who distrusted many others of high military rank, rightly or wrongly, gave him their confidence.

When the war came, Admiral Darlan directed the fleet in a way that met with general approval. At that moment, what exactly were his feelings in regard to the British Admiralty? We could not say with certainty. He probably often made criticisms but these would not necessarily imply real hostility. He appeared even less politically opposed to Great Britain.

Concerning Darlan's character, we will relate one trait without drawing any precise conclusions. At the time of the Norwegian affair which was badly embarked upon at Paul Reynaud's insistence, animated by internal, political preoccupation and against the will of the British Admiralty, a conference of the Allies was held in London at which General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan assisted. The latter made no objection to the operation to which his colleague, General Gamelin had already given his consent. When the operation turned out badly a few weeks later, Paul Reynaud blamed Gamelin and brandished in front of the War Cabinet, a report by Darlan addressed to the Minister of the Navy. This report, written clearly and vigorously, foresaw the difficulties of the engagement and the weaknesses in the execution but the author had not warned Gamelin with whom he was in constant contact.

about the Armistice, Admiral Darlan was not yet in the Government and was not consulted. It seems therefore that, whatever his personal opinion may have been, he did not play an active part in political decisions up to this time.

His political role began the evening of June 16th when Marshal Petain formed the Government and appointed him Minister of the Navy.

It has been said that he appeared very gay that evening. This is the possible physical and psychological reaction of a man of sanguin and buoyant temperament and a short sighted novice in politics.

However, in the days that followed, he resolutely adopted an attitude of deliberate submission to the new policy but he was constantly preoccupied with the fate of the fleet. He was associated with those who believed the surrender of the fleet to the conqueror, dishonorable and declared his resolution to scuttle it all rather than hand it over.

When the Germans made the proposition which we already know, to place the disarmed fleet in French ports and in return would give their solemn word never to demand it, Darlan went with Monsieur Chautemps to see President Herriot, indicated by the former as one of the most pro-British among the French, to consult him. Should one have considered this a trap or on the contrary as the answer to the question of honor which had preoccupied and dominated the Council of Ministers? However, it was after this consultation that the clause was accepted.

A few days later, the fourth of July after the pain-

Affaires Baudoin proposed reprisals against the English but Admiral Darlan in agreement with President Lebrun and M. Chautemps, opposed it.

Therefore it seems that at the beginning of the new regime when Laval and Weygand appeared to be Petain's lieutenants and were also two rivals in the race for power, Darlan, still influenced by the spirit of the former regime and satisfied with the position of minister which had just been given him, was content to place himself little by little in the Marshal's and Laval's intimacy and confidence by hastening to approve their actions.

Darlan's important role began and was favored by the intrigues which always accompany the regimes of dictators. The difficulties which his two rivals encountered a few months later were another factor.

Weygand was first sent to Africa with a resounding title and apparently a great deal of power, in reality he was an ostracized proconsul and he went at the suggestion of his victorious rival, Pierre Laval.

Because of a personal memory we have no doubt about the origin of the high confidence placed in General Weygand when he was entrusted with the defense of the colonies which he so easily relinquished a few months later. In July 1940, we were talking to an intimate confident of Laval and remarked that General Weygand's rivalry constituted a menace to Laval's full power. This friend answered with a meaning smile; "Don't you believe that in the near future, our colonies will have pressing need of inspection by a great chief?"

However the wheel of destiny turns fast as Laval was soon to find out: in turn he was driven from the Government in December.

At that time Darlan was not yet in the running.

The Marshal did not appoint someone in Laval's place; he named a parliamentarian, Pierre Etienne Flandin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Events began to turn out badly. The Germans upheld Laval who therefore appeared to the French, in the crude light, as their man. The people distrusted Flandin, who shortly thereafter was obliged to withdraw because of their open hostility, in spite of his former attitude which should have satisfied them and had evoked general disapproval in 1939.

It was at that time that Darlan began to acquire influence with Marshal Petain by his ability to place himself as arbiter between the men and the theses which opposed each other. He was less outstanding than Laval but more acceptable than Flandin to the Germans. Because of this transaction Darlan found himself, in his turn, at the top, doubtless dazzled by his brilliant fortune which he had never dreamt of previously.

From this moment on, Darlan went through a rapid evolution to total collaboration ideas, driven by the logic of his position. One must not forget that he did not directly succeed Laval in December but Flandin in February. This means that he was not chosen in reaction to Laval's excessive submission to Germany but on the contrary because of the insufficient compliance on the part of Flandin. He was accepted by the Germans only because of the pledges he gave.

In fact he has constantly worked to bring Laval back into the Government and their understanding failed only because of his partner's greed; Laval wanted all the power, in other words Darian's place. At least they have little by little come to an agreement about the program to be realized. Only three months elapsed between Darian's investiture and the odious speech on the 11th of May, so grossly pro-German and anti-British.

Caught between the increasing irritated demands of the Paris collaborationist and the resistance in certain Vichy circles, Darian leaned more and more towards collaboration and became bolder as a result of repeated English defeats and the belief, carefully maintained by a militant diplomacy, that the Americans were less and less disposed to enter the war.

The incidents in Syria, Indo-China and in Africa ^{recalled} (Weygand recalled) mark the periods of his evolution and the struggle which he maintained against those in Petain's circle who had a double preoccupation; first, the question of honor which forbade surrendering the fleet and the naval bases and secondly, farsightedness which would not allow Franco's relations with America to become bad. Little by little those in favor of resistance lost ground and after Weygand was recalled, it seemed as if Marshal Petain would allow himself to be convinced and cease his delaying policy.

At this juncture the United States entered the war and the Germans met reverses in Libya and Russia. The situation was considerably changed. There are some things which are impossible in France even with the means at the disposal of a dictatorship. The most impossible

of all would be to make the French accept the idea of being opposed to the United States.

The French Government gave new assurances of their neutrality especially concerning the fleet. This is an important fact. The American Government with remarkable political intelligence, in the light of this new situation, resumed a policy of good will thanks to which, for more than a year, the French policy has been prevented from slipping into a military collaboration with Germany.

What will be Admiral Darlan's attitude in this new situation? It is difficult to predict.

It may be that he feels too much involved to be able to retrace his steps and that he has become used to really thinking in a pro-German and anti-British sense. However rumors have reached us here which, coupled with the recent assertions of neutrality make one think that perhaps he is anxious about the future, confronted by the strength of the Allies and on the other hand by the fear of being replaced by younger, more ardent and more sincere fascists like his Minister of the Interior, Pierre Pucheu.

A new course of action on his part would not be impossible. He is not a doctrinaire nor a militant who would be held back by passions and his scruples. He is merely a politician who has adopted the attitude which he judged opportune. He believed in a German victory and founded his political career on it. Perhaps he even had the illusion that his adherence to the orders of the conqueror would lighten the price of defeat and would procure him the gratitude of his fellow citizens.

But the wave has turned and perhaps Darlan is meditating on the events and a new course which he could attempt, although it would be difficult for him to do so now. However, he would doubtless have Marshal Pétain's support for in his heart the Marshal values American friendship very highly and only adhered to the principle of collaboration under pressure of the men and the events in the hope of gaining time.

For these reasons it is not impossible to hope that the wise and measured policy of the American Government will bear fruit.

If events should turn out otherwise there would always be time enough to resort to a more rigorous attitude, which then would be better understood by French public opinion. It is essential to base a course of action on French public opinion for no matter what happens, it will always be for the United States.

Note
 sur le sujet de l'Amiral Darlan

Pour bien comprendre l'enchaînement des événements historiques, il est utile de connaître le caractère des hommes qui n'y trouvent mêlés. Il en est spécialement ainsi de la politique française depuis l'armistice franco-allemand.

Les caractères qu'il faut étudier sont d'ailleurs très divers, ce qui explique les hésitations et les contradictions de cette politique.

Certains des leaders de la France actuelle, surtout ceux qui vivent à Paris dans l'intimité des Allemands, mais aussi quelques-uns à Vichy, étaient déjà acquis aux idées fascistes avant la guerre, les uns par aberration doctrinale, les autres par haine sectaire et aveugle de la démocratie, d'autres enfin par ambition ou intérêt.

A l'opposé, certains des collaborateurs du Maréchal Pétain, comme lui-même, n'avaient pas d'idées politiques préoccupantes, moins en politique extérieure, et ont plutôt subi que conseillé la collaboration avec l'Allemagne, qu'ils ont souvent tenté de limiter ou de retarder.

Enfin, il existe, entre ces deux extrêmes, une catégorie de politiciens, sans doctrine comme sans caractère, qui se sont jetés cyniquement dans la politique nouvelle, sans l'avoir jamais envisagée auparavant, dans le seul but de profiter des avantages des remous politiques pour se placer favorablement et faire carrière sur un régime comme ils l'avaient fait d'abord sur le régime opposé.

L'Amiral Darlan appartient sans aucun doute possible à cette dernière catégorie.

Rien dans son passé ne semblait le vouer aux théories totalitaires, car il avait été le constant favori du régime démocratique, dans lequel, tout en le critiquant sans doute, il se sentait évidemment à l'aise.

Il était le fils d'un homme politique de second plan, d'opinions modérées, qui avait été une fois Ministre de la Justice vers la fin du dernier siècle, en 1897, c'est-à-dire quand le futur Amiral était âgé d'environ 16 ou 17 ans.

Cet honorable Garde des Sceaux n'a pas laissé une trace fulgurante dans l'histoire de la troisième République. Mais il était d'une région qui a donné au Pays plusieurs hommes politiques influents, en particulier le Président de la République Fallières. Et le jeune officier de marine n'a jamais cessé de bénéficier des précieux appuis que lui valait le souvenir de son père.

Autant qu'un profane en puisse juger, il semble avoir témoigné de réelles qualités d'intelligence et de technicité. Toutefois, sa carrière privilégiée l'a souvent amené dans les Cabinets ministériels de la rue Royale. Ses avancements en ont été sans doute facilités et il est arrivé, jeune encore, aux plus hauts grades de la marine.

2

Devenu Chef d'Etat Major de la Marine française, il collabora d'une façon spéciale avec un Ministre de valeur, Georges Leygues, qui s'était consacré, après une carrière brillante et variée, à la reconstruction de la flotte française, négligée pendant un certain temps. Il serait injuste de ne pas reconnaître que l'Amiral Darlan a accompli sous la direction de Georges Leygues un travail important. L'effort entrepris à cette époque, poursuivi par Darlan sous l'autorité de Ministres successifs, en particulier d'Albert Sarraut, avait amené la flotte française, à la veille de la guerre, à un état très satisfaisant.

C'est une constatation de fait qu'il serait important de perdre de vue à l'heure actuelle: compte tenu des limitations résultant des ~~limitations~~ conventions internationales et des possibilités financières, la flotte française est un instrument de guerre encore sérieux, dont il faut se garder de provoquer la reddition à l'Allemagne. Nous nous empressons d'ajouter que nous ne croyons pas, pour notre part, une telle reddition possible. Darlan, comme Chef de la Marine française, jouissant dans le Pays d'une situation de choix, il bénéficiait d'avantages matériels et moraux importants, était consulté à tout instant par les Gouvernements, et était entouré dans la société d'une haute considération.

Sa manière d'être personnelle aidait à son standing social. Trappu, l'oeil vif, le teint coloré comme s'il n'avait jamais quitté son bateau, fumant la pipe, usant d'un langage décidé et volontiers truculent, il donnait à l'observateur superficiel l'illusion d'un caractère.

Pourquoi cet homme choqué, gâté, par le régime républicain, parvenu à ce qu'il devait logiquement considérer comme le maximum de la plus heureuse carrière pour un marin, aurait-il été aigri et hostile à un régime dans lequel il était né et qui l'avait porté au faîte de la hiérarchie militaire et sociale? De fait, il pouvait nourrir dans son cœur des sentiments conservateurs, mais il était manifestement à l'aise dans le régime et n'était certainement pas mêlé, avant la guerre, aux cabales, agitations et complots de toutes sortes auxquels se complaisaient trop de gens du monde, d'hommes d'affaires et même d'officiers. En tous cas, les hommes politiques, qui éprouvaient une certaine méfiance à l'égard de beaucoup d'autres militaires de hauts grades, lui accordaient, à tort ou à raison, leur confiance.

Lorsque vint la guerre, l'Amiral Darlan dirigea sa flotte dans des conditions qui furent généralement approuvées. Quela étaient exactement, à ce moment, ses sentiments à l'égard de l'Amirauté britannique? Nous ne saurions le dire avec certitude. Il nous semble qu'il devait émettre volontiers des critiques, mais que celles-ci ne devaient pas impliquer une hostilité réelle. Moins encore apparaissait-il opposé politiquement à la Grande-Bretagne.

Au sujet du caractère de Darlan, nous ne relaterons qu'un trait, sans en tirer de conclusions précises: Au moment de l'affaire de Norvège, qui était mal engagée sur l'insistance de Paul Reynaud, animé d'une préoccupation de politique intérieure, et contre le gré de l'Amirauté britannique, une Conférence interalliée se tenait à Londres, à laquelle assistaient le Généralissime Gamelin et l'Amiral Darlan. Celui-ci ne souleva aucune objection contre le

consentement donné à l'opération par son collègue. Mais, lorsque, quelques semaines plus tard, l'affaire ayant mal tourné, Paul Reynaud en appela Camille, il brandit devant le Général de Gaulle un rapport adressé par Darlan au Ministre de la Marine, rapport d'ailleurs clair et vigoureux, mais qui prévoyait les difficultés de l'engagement et les faiblesses de l'exécution, et dont son auteur n'avait pas averti le Généralissime avec lequel il était en contact constant.

Au moment des ultimes débats du Cabinet Reynaud au sujet de l'armistice, l'Amiral Darlan n'était pas encore au Gouvernement et n'a pas été consulté. Il paraît donc, quelle que fut à cette date son opinion personnelle, n'avoir joué aucun rôle actif dans les décisions politiques jusqu'à cette époque.

Son rôle politique ne commence que dans cette soirée du 16 Juin, lorsque le Maréchal Pétain forme le Gouvernement et l'appelle au Ministère de la Marine.

On a dit qu'il avait manifesté dans cette soirée une grande gaîté. C'est une réaction physique et psychologique possible de la part d'un homme sanguin, euphorique, et d'un politicien avisé et à courte vue.

Cependant, dans les jours qui suivirent, s'il adopta résolument une attitude de soumission délibérée à l'égard de la nouvelle politique, il ne cessa de se préoccuper du sort de la flotte. Il s'associa à ceux qui jugeaient désavantageux sa reddition au vainqueur et il proclama sa résolution de la saborder plutôt que de la livrer.

Et quand les Allemands eurent fait la proposition que l'on sait, de placer cette flotte désarmée dans des ports français, prenant l'engagement solennel de ne jamais la réclamer, Darlan, soucieux, se rendit avec M. Chautemps chez le Président Herriot, indiqué par le précédent comme le plus anglophile des Français, pour le consulter. Devait-on considérer cette formule comme un piège, ou au contraire comme répondant suffisamment à la préoccupation d'honneur qui avait dominé le Conseil des Ministres? Et c'est après cette consultation que la clause fut acceptée.

Quelques jours plus tard, le 4 Juillet, lorsque, après le douloureux incident de Mers-El-Khebir, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Baudoin proposa des représailles contre les Anglais, l'Amiral Darlan fut d'accord avec le Président Lebrun et avec M. Chautemps pour s'y opposer.

Il semble donc qu'au début du nouveau régime, lorsque Laval et Weygand apparaissaient comme les deux lieutenants de Pétain et les deux rivaux dans la course au pouvoir, Darlan, encore imbu de l'esprit de l'ancien régime, et satisfait du rôle de Ministre qui venait de lui être dévolu, se contentait de se placer peu à peu dans la confiance et l'intimité du Maréchal et de Laval par un empressement servile à approuver leurs actes.

Le rôle de premier plan de Darlan ne va commencer qu'à la faveur des intrigues qui accompagnent toujours les régimes de dictature et avec les difficultés qui assailliront quelques mois plus tard les deux prétendants.

Weygand est d'abord envoyé en Afrique avec un titre ronflant et un grand pouvoir apparent, en réalité en proconsulat d'extrême.

4
 sur la suggestion de son concurrent vichyste, Pierre Laval, sur l'origine de cette haute confiance dont il fut l'objet pour défendre des colonies à la garde desquelles il devait plus tard si aisément renoncer, nous ne pouvons garder le moindre doute, en raison d'un souvenir personnel satisfait. Dès le mois de juillet 1940, comme nous faisons à un intime confident de Laval une réflexion au sujet de la menace que constituait pour lui toute possibilité de se déstabiliser la rivalité du Général Weygand, cet ami de Laval nous répondit avec un sourire plein de sagesse : " Ne croyez-vous pas que, dans un proche avenir, nos colonies auront un pressant besoin de l'inspection d'un grand chef ? " Mais la roue du destin tourne vite. Et Laval devait en faire bientôt l'expérience, puisqu'il était à son tour chassé du Gouvernement au mois de Décembre suivant.

A ce moment Darlan n'est pas encore dans la course. Le Maréchal ne nous pas de nouvel héritier et appelle au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères un parle-maitre, Pierre- Etienne Flandin.

Mais l'affaire prend une mauvaise tournure avec les Allemands. Ceux-ci soutiennent Laval, qui apparaît ainsi aux Français dans une lumière grise comme leur homme. Ils se méfient de Flandin, qui devra bientôt se retirer devant leur hostilité ouverte, en dépit d'une attitude antérieure qui aurait dû les satisfaire et qui avait soulevé la réprobation générale en 1939. C'est alors que Darlan prend de l'importance sur le Maréchal Pétain, par son aptitude à se poser comme l'arbitre entre les hommes et les thèses qui s'opposent. Il sera moins voyant que Laval, mais il sera mieux aimé que Flandin par les Allemands. Et à la faveur de cette transaction, le voilé à son tour au pinacle, lui-même ébloui certainement d'un sort éclatant dont il n'avait jamais nullement rêvé.

A partir de ce moment, Darlan va évoluer avec rapidité vers les idées totalement collaborationnistes, poussé par la logique de sa position. Il ne faut pas oublier qu'il n'a pas succédé directement en Décembre à Laval, mais en Février à Flandin. Cela signifie qu'il n'a pas été choisi en réaction contre l'écueil de soumission à l'Allemagne du premier, mais au contraire contre l'insuffisance de soumission à l'Allemagne du second. Il n'a été accepté par les Allemands, qu'en raison des gains qu'il leur donnait. En effet il n'a cessé de travailler à ranimer Laval dans le Gouvernement, et leur entente n'a échoué qu'en raison de la gourmandise de son partenaire, qui exigeait la totalité du pouvoir, c'est-à-dire sa propre place. Au moins s'est-il mis d'accord avec lui, peu à peu, sur le programme à réaliser. Il ne s'est écoulé que 3 mois entre son investiture et l'odieux discours du 31 Mai, grossièrement pro-allemand et anti-britannique.

Pris entre les exigences exigeantes et irritées des collaborationnistes de Paris et les résistances de certains cercles de Vichy, il a tenu de plus en plus vers la collaboration, enhardi par les succès répétés des Anglais et par la croyance, soigneusement entretenue par une diplomatie militante, que les Etats-Unis étaient de moins en moins disposés à entrer dans la guerre.

Les incidents de Syrie, d'Indo-Chine, et de l'Afrique du Nord (rappel de Weygand) ont jalonné les étapes de son évolution.

5.
 ... et de la lutte qu'il avait à soutenir contre ceux qui, dans l'entourage du Maréchal Pétain, avaient davantage le double souci de l'honneur, qui interdisait de livrer la flotte et les bases navales, et de la clairvoyance, qui interdisait de troubler la France avec l'Amérique. Peu à peu, le camp des résistants perdait du terrain et il semblait, après le rappel de Weygand, que le Maréchal lui-même allait se laisser convaincre et cesser sa politique d'atermoiements.

Mais voici les Etats-Unis en guerre, et les échecs allemands, en Russie et en Lybie. La conjoncture est sensiblement modifiée. Il y a des choses impossibles en France, même avec les moyens de la dictature. Et la chose la plus impossible est de faire accepter aux Français qu'ils pourraient jamais être opposés aux Etats-Unis.

Le Gouvernement français a donné de nouvelles assurances de neutralité, en particulier au sujet de la flotte. C'est un fait très important. Et le Gouvernement américain, avec une remarquable intelligence politique, a marqué cette nouvelle situation par la reprise de la politique de bienveillance grâce à laquelle il a empêché de puis un an la politique française de glisser à la collaboration militaire avec l'Allemagne.

..

Quelle sera maintenant l'attitude de l'Amiral Juriën en face de cette nouvelle situation? Il est difficile de le présager.

On peut penser qu'il se sent trop engagé pour pouvoir revenir en arrière et qu'il s'est accoutumé à penser réellement dans le sens pro-allemand et anti-britannique. Et pourtant des rumeurs parviennent ici qui, jointes aux récentes affirmations de neutralité, feraient penser qu'il est inquiet de l'avenir, en face de la force des Allies, et qu'il redoute d'autre part d'être dépassé, dans la faveur des Allemands, par certains éléments plus jeunes, plus ardents et plus sincèrement fascistes, comme son Ministre de l'Intérieur Pierre Pucheu.

Une nouvelle évolution de sa part ne serait donc peut-être pas impossible. Il n'est pas un doctrinaire ni un militant, qui serait retenu par leurs scrupules ou leurs passions. Il est seulement un politicien qui a adopté l'attitude qu'il jugeait opportune. Il a cru à la victoire allemande et a fondé sur elle sa carrière politique. Peut-être même a-t-il eu l'illusion de croire que son adhésion aux ordres du vainqueur allègerait le prix de la défaite et lui vaudrait la gratitude de ses concitoyens. Mais, la vague ayant tourné, il peut méditer sur les événements et tenter de prendre une nouvelle voie. Celle-ci lui serait maintenant bien difficile. Pourtant il trouverait sans doute un appui dans le Maréchal Pétain qui, dans son fort intérieur, attache certainement un grand prix à l'amitié des Etats-Unis et ne s'est rallié au principe de la collaboration que sous la pression des faits et des hommes et avec le désir de gagner du temps.

Il n'est donc pas interdit d'espérer que la politique sage et mesurée adoptée par le Gouvernement américain portera ses fruits. S'il en était autrement, il serait toujours temps de recourir à une attitude plus rigoureuse, qui serait alors mieux comprise de l'opinion publique française, sur laquelle il est essentiel de s'appuyer, car elle demeurera toujours, quoi qu'il arrive, avec l'Amérique.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION

11/2 Willey -

Mr. Hoskins asked me
to send you these in accordance
with your conversation of
several days ago.

Robert Hollister

to: Col. Donovan

Attached is
light on Otto
Shasser.

Please
return to

John

Bill

FROM: JOHN C. WILLEY



-15-

Letter from Dr. Theo. Fuchs, Santiago de Chile.

Copy

Santiago, November 20, 1941.

Dr. Otto Strasser
Post Box 324
Westmount-Montreal, Canada.

My dear Doctor:

Although it is really no joke with me to make life difficult for you and to criticize, when there are no valid grounds to do so, I must, however, add a supplement to my last letter of November 11.

In a letter from Fricke to Bussemeyer of the 13th of this month, submitted to me in agreement with the sender (addressee?), the following statement occurs among other pleasant expressions:

"In reality we are not thinking at all of letting these old Sheikhs like Bruening, etc. and that "democratized" medley which marches under the banner of the Free German Movement ever play any role. We are National Socialists now as before, who, for practical reasons, are merely willing to establish bonds with these antiquated people because these troublesome idiots of reactionary Chamberlains and capitalist businessmen in Washington still attribute importance to Messrs. Mann, Bruening, Sallman, etc.

"In reality, we know perfectly well that this war

will

-17-

will turn into a Socialist Revolution and that Wall Street as well as London is conscious of this situation and on that account fights against Strasser.

"And then Fuchs writes that the confidence of Americans and English in Strasser's shrewdness is slipping. I have not heard anything so stupid for a long time and it proves the complete shortsightedness of a man who wants to be a statesman and 'not company leader'".

(Note: Both allusions to my statements are distorted, since they are taken from their context. Fuchs.)

The letter of Strasser's national leader for South America and Vice President of Strasser's Free German Movement continues as follows:

"I am not at all a member of both, but a member of the Black Front, which is battling for power and which will achieve this power. This Black Front, however, is led in a military fashion and follows its chief with blind obedience, so long as he remains true to the idea.

"This idea is: The German Socialistic Revolution and it will be bloodily carried through in the Reich. For that purpose, it would be very favorable, if we had now gained influence and were now ready to play a rôle

inside

-18-

inside a national council and also outside the Reich.

"In principle, however, these are merely events which play a part on the periphery and have exclusive tactical significance. The existence of the Black Front is thereby in no way touched and the will to carry through the revolution is not at all weakened.

"The Allies have long recognized this, because they are wiser than Dr. Fuchs, and only on that account do they temporarily reject Strasser and his group.

"...and during this year, we are making time, in order to make use of all tactical possibilities offered and to organize a Free German Movement which might perhaps one day be most useful.

"And in their anxiety about the socialist revolution the Allies lost a valuable year for themselves, and then later had to bite into the sour apple...

"...If the thing seems too stupid to me, and Strasser probably thinks so, then we'll chuck the troublesome 'Free German Movement' entirely aside, and other people can then amuse themselves with it....

"With the fall of Hitler, the Free German Movement dies. The Black Front will fight on, until, during or after the war, it takes possession of the power and determines the history of the present time.

"You

-10-

"You (the addressee, Bussanmeyer, in Chile, in meant - note) are a Black Front man and have at present, your task to accomplish inside the Free German Movement, to make the Chilean section mobile for our purpose and on the basis of our present tactical considerations.

"If that is not possible for you, because you like Fuchs have come to have another opinion, then please let me know; the responsibility will then be mine, because I trusted you too much and I must then find some other means. In no case, however, does the matter remain stable, you can rely on that..." (My underlining. Fuchs)*

The distortions and striking false judgments with which Fricke's letter is strewn are not of interest here. What is interesting is that the man who has such edifying words for the Free German Movement is the same one whom you (Dr. Otto Strasser), recently proposed to us as "First Vice President" and who now practically characterizes the Father of the Free German Movement as a cheat, your bosom friend, whom you have always sheltered and of whom you seemed to believe whatever he devised, among other things, the bold lies about my "not working" in Chile.

As is unfortunately now clear, he is not only a man with a command-complex, who lives in a cloud of foolish illusions,

-20-

illusions, he is, thanks to your unwavering friendship for him, a person who has become dangerous for the continuance for our Free German Movement, who must promptly be removed.

Let me speak quite openly: On the point of decency and honor I know no compromise. We have, indeed, begun the Free German Movement with a lie, since Fricke was made national representative for Paraguay, although he did not stay there, but in Buenos Aires. We are carrying a similar lie further today as the actual representative for Argentina is not Trenkelbach, as stated, but again Fricke. He himself writes concerning this as follows:

"...Moreover, you know perfectly well that Trenkelbach is a nonentity, a very nice and good and decent nonentity, and I do all the work here."

These two lies are to your account, Doctor. In addition to this is the fact that, in spite of our democratic constitution and the obligations for the president resulting therefrom, you like to face your fellow-workers, that "democratized medley of the Free German Movement" according to Fricke, with accomplished facts and act according to your own discretion, although you cannot yet know anything about American conditions.

To

-21-

To your account is the recognition and retention of Schönmeyer and the choice of his "Zeit" (Time) the "pronounced revolver-and-extortion-sheet, which is available to anyone who has paid" (I quote), as our official organ. As the Tagger incident shows, you still automatically order removals from our rolls, as if you had to do with subjects.

And now your intimate friend comes on the scene and explains that our whole Free German Movement is a comedy, set up in order to achieve power on the backs of duped adherents who, according to the good Nazi recipe, are later to be quickly cut loose again (with or without a Black Front Gestapo?).

More still: he says boldly that our only goal is not the development of our announced program, but the socialistic revolution, to be bloodily accomplished in the Reich, of which - as I again pointed out a short time ago - not a word was ever said in the Free German Movement's program.

That is not only deceit, that is real crime; for the idea of, by violence if necessary, forcing the Black Front program (however beautiful and desirable it may be as such) upon the people, exhausted and bled by the war and the Hitler régime, is madness. People with feelings
of

-22-

of responsibility, for whom the question is in truth one of the country and not of themselves, can not think such thoughts, much less those people to whom the term of selected characters, used by you, would apply.

After the experiences which gave rise to my above-mentioned letter of the 11th, it is unfortunately difficult for me to assume that Fricke's conviction is unknown to you. Dear Doctor, I and my comrades have made ourselves available to serve Germany, not to overpower our people, as your fellow-workers, not as stupid non-commissioned officers who obediently hold their tongues.

As a man of honor and an officer it is quite impossible for me to watch a movement and thereby to allow myself to share the guilt of an expounded deception, the victim of which is for a second time to be the much-tried German people. Whoever professes Hitler's gangster methods, he should either fight under his standard or raise his own standard for mercenaries, but he should appear with his visor open and not treat "Free Germany" unfairly. The name of the fatherland is too holy for anyone to take it in vain, for anyone to be able to misuse it for the purpose of surreptitiously achieving power. Whoever intends such a thing, has nothing to seek under our standard.

On

-25-

On the foregoing grounds, I herewith make the formal proposal that the comrades might declare Fricke to have lost his membership in the Free German Movement on account of his betrayal made of the motives and purpose thereof. At the same time I request the President to remove him immediately from his duties as head of the Gaukreis (District), as it is unquestionably possible to do since offices are merely offices and are subordinate to the views of the central direction.

In order further to hasten the absolutely necessary clarification of the situation and to meet future lapses, I, as founder of the Free German Movement and national chairman for Chile, request the President to be good enough, in the next circular letter from the central direction, unequivocally to deny the opinions set forth in Fricke's letter and expressed by Fricke himself.

If my request is rejected, I would have to assume that you are in fact substantially in agreement with Fricke. In my opinion, that could not but be a disastrous blow not only for you, but for the German opposition in general, but it would not prevent me from trying to have you deposed as president.

You may in any case have the assurance that I will

be

-24-

be a flame to guarantee the honorableness and propriety
of our Free German Movement and to prevent its being
misused as the tool of unspeakable interests.

With a comradely greeting,

(Addition for Kappel: What do you say of this?)

-25-

COPY

New York, November 27, 1941.

Dr. Theo Fuchs,
P. O. Box 3277,
Santiago, Chile.

Dear Friend Fuchs:

Your letter of November 20 (the copy of your communication to Strasser) has just come and crossed my letter of November 20 which I hope you have meanwhile received and which will show you that our mutual views on the situation are completely in agreement. We can no longer work with Dr. Otto Strasser; the man is a danger, he brings anarchy. No thunderbolt can show up a situation as more frightening, unmistakable and alarming than Fricke's letter which shows up the skullduggery which is being carried on under the "Free German" standard.

With this letter from the "First Vice President of the Free German Movement" and Otto Strasser's confidential agent, Otto Strasser's Free German Movement is killed. It will in good measure depend on us if this call to Germany's freedom is not lost as a farce. But we should not hastily seek any new union, in order that all our strength and the confidence of our friends shall not again be squandered in vain for shortsighted, special interests

-26-

interests of a political "Führer", before we have examined it through a microscope.

I have not the slightest doubt that Fricke's viewpoint is also that of Strasser. His coldbloodedness gives evidence, further, that the Vice President is a good Himmler-type No. 2, but no statesman. It is thus all to the good that this plainness and clarification occurred so explosively.

There is no need to wait to see how Strasser will extricate himself. There is no further hesitation for us. We are neither putsch-ists by calling nor professional revolutionists. We want, in fine, fairness and a decent political attitude - that is our war aim. If we further support or only cover up such ratcatching organizations, we make ourselves jointly guilty.

I accordingly request of you permission to make use of this cocky revelation of Fricke. I am, in addition, convinced that you have already taken the necessary measures on your own account, as you have special American friends down there. We must without fail inform the State Department in Washington, in order that the U.S. officials may at once discontinue any further printing of Strasser's pamphlets - which deceive the credulous and misuse them for a new gangster outbreak.

Washington

-27-

Washington will also thereby be convinced that we are honorable. We could really take "fairness or death" as the motto, so important is it.

Please let me know by return mail how we are to proceed.

With greetings and a handshake, yours

F. M. RANDOL

TR:AVA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

DECEMBER 10, 1940
No. 600

POLICY REGARDING "FREE MOVEMENTS" IN THE UNITED STATES

The following is the policy of the Department of State towards the activities of foreign political leaders in the United States:

"The military occupation by Axis powers of many areas and countries in Europe has led to the destruction of a number of governments and to domination by the Axis over a number of other governments.

"As a result, political leaders assuming to represent the peoples of such countries, or various groups in them, have been coming to the United States in increasing numbers. It seems advisable to make clear the attitude of this Government towards them and towards their political activities in the United States.

"The United States is composed of citizens from many national backgrounds. Despite a natural interest in their country of origin, all American citizens of whatever background are, and have, an undivided allegiance to the United States. This is in no way inconsistent with the pride which they naturally take in the cultural, artistic and spiritual contributions made to American life by citizens of their national background, and made to civilization by the countries from which they or their ancestors may have come. The Government of the United States does not look with favor on any activities designed to divide the allegiance of any group of American residents between the United States and any foreign government, in existence or in prospect. The first concern of the United States must always be the unity of the country, based on the American way of life and the ideal of liberty many times invoked since its first statement in our Declaration of Independence.

"In harmony with the basic principles of liberty, the people of the United States do have a sympathetic interest in movements by aliens in this country who desire to liberate their countries from Axis domination.

"The Department of State is glad to be informed of the plans and proposed activities of such 'free movements' and of organizations representing such movements. It will be realized that agents of foreign principals, including agents of foreign governments or committees, are required to register with the State Department under existing law. Such registration does not indicate either approval or disapproval of the organization so registered.

"In general the Government of the United States does not favor 'free movements' or groups representing such movements which carry on activities contrary to the established policies, domestic or foreign, of the Government of the United States; and prefers that the governing committees of such movements shall be composed of citizens of the foreign country, rather than of American sympathizers. It disapproves of any attempt to enlist the support of

-2-

of American citizens of like racial background on the theory that they are 'fellow nationals', though it recognizes that because of a common race background American citizens acting as Americans and with full allegiance to the United States may nevertheless be sympathetic to the national aspirations of their country of racial origin, and may organize in sympathetic and friendly support of such aspirations.

"The Department has taken cognizance of the existence of a number of committees representing free movements, but has not extended any form of recognition to them, formal or informal. The Department has not sought to influence any resident alien or any American citizen in determining whether or not it is desirable for him to associate himself with the support of any such free movement or any organization designed for that end."

An officer of the Department, Mr. Harold S. Hopkins, has been assigned to keep informed on the activities of these movements.

* * *

TO:

COLONEL. DONOVAN

Feb. 16, 1942

It may interest you to read
the attached correspondence
before lunch next Friday.



FROM: JOHN C. WILEY

Van. Ganselaert

3328

Frans J. Van Ganselaert
470 Park Avenue
New York City

Ce 12 février 1942.

Cher Monsieur Wiley,

Je viens de recevoir de Monsieur Doob, du département Rockefeller, la lettre ci-jointe, que confirme les dispositions favorables, dont vous avez bien voulu me donner connaissance.

Vous trouverez également ci-joint la réponse que j'ai adressée à Monsieur Doob. J'espère qu'elle reflète votre propre sentiment. Si nous voulons pouvoir compter sur la solidarité des Républiques de l'Amérique latine, nous ne pouvons pas négliger aucun effort ni aucune précaution. Nous ne pouvons pas calculer notre action sur un minimum de sécurité, nous devons viser à un maximum de collaboration de la part de ces pays. Nous ne pouvons pas compter avec le temps que nous avons encore à perdre, nous devons nous demander comment nous pourrions regagner une partie du temps perdu. Si tel est notre état d'esprit nous serons désireux de trouver la formule la plus efficace de collaboration, et je suis sûr que tous les autres associés, les Britanniques compris, seront heureux de s'y rallier quelle qu'elle soit pourvu qu'elle rencontre l'agrément des Etats Unis.

Pour être pratique, il faudrait commencer par un ou deux pays importants. P.Ex. le Mexique. Trois ou quatre délégués, munis des informations nécessaires se mettraient autour de la table pour dresser ensemble un tableau de la situation et si possible un plan de campagne. En cas de besoin on prendrait l'avion pour compléter sur place soit les investigations soit l'organisation du travail.

Dans le cas où le département compétent aurait besoin de quelque temps encore pour prendre une décision d'ensemble, la suggestion que je viens de faire pourrait servir d'expérience. Il suffirait que de votre côté le service compétent désigne un représentant. Les Anglais en feraient autant et je crois pouvoir dire que du côté belge il n'y aurait aucune objection que je me joigne à eux. Je suis personnellement convaincu que cette première expérience serait démonstrative en faveur d'une coopération plus large et plus durable.

- 2 -

Je ne voudrais pas soumettre cette idée au département de Monsieur Rockefeller, sans que j'ai eu l'occasion d'en délibérer avec vous. Voulez-vous être si aimable d'y réfléchir?

Recevez, en attendant, cher Monsieur Wiley, l'assurance de mes sentiments les plus dévoués.

(Signed) Frans J. Van Cauwelaert

A Monsieur John C. Wiley,
Ministre Plénipotentiaire des E.U.A.
Washington, D. C.

February 11, 1942.

Mr. Leonard W. Doob,
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,
Commerce Department Building,
Washington, D. C.

Cher Monsieur Doob,

Je suis heureux d'apprendre que le projet de propagande que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre à votre département y est l'objet d'un examen favorable, et j'attendrai avec la patience nécessaire les conclusions finales.

Je ne mets dans cette question aucune espèce d'amour propre et quelle que soit la décision, à laquelle votre direction s'arrêtera, je n'en apprécierai pas moins les sentiments de bienveillance que j'ai toujours rencontrés auprès d'elle. Mais j'espère qu'elle sera pénétrée comme moi de la nécessité d'adopter dans le domaine de la propagande comme dans tous les autres, les méthodes de travail et de collaboration, qui assurent à notre cause - car devant l'épouvantable tragédie de cette guerre nous n'en avons qu'une seule, celle de la victoire - le plus de succès dans le délai le plus bref possible.

Un des grands publicistes allemands - un catholique - envoyé à Bruxelles au commencement de la guerre comme conseiller à l'ambassade d'Allemagne et qui à l'heure actuelle opère à Lisbonne, laissa échapper en ma présence l'aveu, qu'au moment de son départ de Berlin, Ribbentrop lui avait déclaré que cette guerre devait être gagnée par la propagande. Vous savez combien cette propagande est active et influente dans les pays de l'Amérique latine. La répression entreprise, depuis l'entrée en guerre de votre pays, par la plupart des gouvernements de ces pays agit dans le coeur des amis de l'axe comme un stimulant et dans une lettre que je viens de recevoir d'une personnalité catholique, qui est intimement mêlée à la vie politique de Bogota, m'apporte une preuve nouvelle que nous ne pouvons négliger ni aucune vigilance ni aucun effort. Voici ce qu'elle m'écrit au sujet de Mgr. Gonzales, auxiliaire de l'archevêque de Bogota: "Je vous signale que les préjugés à vaincre sont ici d'autant plus durs que l'Archevêque coadjuteur, Mgr. Gonzales Arbelaez, qui dirige l'action catholique dans ce pays et dont l'autorité et la popularité sont très grandes dans certains milieux conservateurs (pas tous heureusement) est considéré ici

- 2 -

"comme 'Nazi déclaré'. Il serait opposé à l'attitude 'conciliatrice de son chef, l'Archevêque Perdomo, un saint homme fort modéré, et chercherait à provoquer, avec l'aide de Mr. Laureano Gomez, le chef du parti 'conservateur, par des attitudes intransigeantes, une réaction de la part des adversaires politiques, les 'libéraux qui ont actuellement le gouvernement, de façon à provoquer des désordres et troubler les esprits. 'Laureano Gomez est d'ailleurs une expèce de Bégrelle 'dans sa première époque."

Le cas de Mgr. Gonzalez - dont je vous parle à titre confidentiel - est symptomatique, mais il n'est pas isolé. Je suis sûr que par exemple au Mexique - pour ne rester que dans les pays les plus directement compris dans la zone de sécurité américaine - il ne serait pas difficile de rencontrer des réactions semblables.

Je m'associerai volontiers, dans la mesure de mes moyens, à tout programme d'action, qui pourrait apparaître plus opportun ou plus efficace que celui que j'ai proposé. Mais je souhaite ardemment que l'on puisse arriver à une meilleure utilisation de nos ressources morales. On reproche souvent aux nations démocratiques, et plus particulièrement aux Anglo-saxons, de ne pas posséder comme nos ennemis le génie de l'organisation. Je ne crois pas à une infériorité congénitale. Mais nous devons, hélas, toujours passer par la douloureuse école de l'expérience avant de consacrer nos efforts à la discipline et à la coordination indispensables.

J'espère, Cher Monsieur Doob, que vous ne trouverez dans ces réflexions que l'expression de mon souci de servir au mieux les graves intérêts, auxquels vous-même et vos collègues vous vous consacrez avec tant de dévouement et vous me trouverez prêt à une confiante collaboration. toujours

Il vous intéressera sans doute d'apprendre que je viens à Washington le 20 février (vendredi) et que j'y serai occupé à partir de une heure pour le reste de la journée. Si vous même, ou quelqu'autre personnalité de votre office souhaitez me voir dans le courant de la matinée ou même soit la veille ou le samedi, je me rendrai volontiers à votre désir.

Recevez, je vous prie, cher Monsieur Doob, l'assurance de mes sentiments les plus distinguées.

Frans J. Van Cauwelaert

Copy

February 10, 1942.

Mr. Frans J. Van Cauwelaert,
470 Park Avenue,
New York, New York.

Dear Mr. Van Cauwelaert:

I am very sorry that I have not been able to communicate with you sooner. The general project which you have outlined is now meeting with almost universal approval throughout this Office. Unfortunately progress on a matter such as this appears to be very slow. I do not know, therefore, when I shall be able to send you definitive word. This note is simply to suggest that you should not be discouraged in reference to us.

Sincerely yours,

(s) Leon W. Doob.

Van Coudenberghe
Field, Army

February 11, 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DUBOVAN:

I enclose herewith translation of a letter I recently received from Frans van Cauwelaert. You might be interested in reading it before our lunch tomorrow.

The second paragraph refers to Count Sforza. The third paragraph is interesting on the subject of American Catholic funds going to the Sinarquistas.


John C. Willey.

TRANSLATION

To Mr. John C. Wiley
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

New York, February 3, 1944

Please excuse me for not having written you sooner about the Italian person of whom you spoke to me. The information that I have received since, allows me to say that while in Mexico I shock you to find him appearing as a Catholic center in a purely Catholic milieu, the milieu itself would not be shocked were it a matter of Italian propaganda in general. I personally believe that, given his authority in matters of international politics, he would be a choice lecturer for Italian centers in South America.

I have also thought over the question that the Colonel put to me re Sinarquism and have consulted a friend who is very well informed about things in Mexico. My own feeling still is that the Sinarquist movement must be followed with caution, or at least with a certain reserve. The principles it proclaims are not bad in themselves -- on the contrary -- but it betrays fascist influences in its organization and creates a state of mind which renders its initiatives susceptible to Axis infiltration. However, its influence seems to be quite weak in spite of the considerable number of sympathizers which its chiefs claim to have.

Would it be possible, as one of the Colonel's informants claims, to win Sinarquism to our cause? This would evidently depend on the choice of its leaders and I have realized since our last talk that its present leaders might have some particular cause for gratitude to American Catholics. Abascal, the chief who has since been replaced by Torres Bueno, the lawyer, in answering to the attacks on the movement in the Chamber of Deputies, revealed that he had received money from American Catholics for their colonization work and that even the White House knew the origin of this money. But I still believe that it would be wise to watch the back gates of access by which the totalitarian marauders and their accomplices find their way in. Our enemies are masters in the art of camouflage.

I shall not fail, Mr. Wiley, to let you know if I should by chance have to return to Washington. In the meantime, I thank you for the kind interest you have taken in the case of my friend, Professor de Rooy.

Believe me to be,

Frans van Cauwelaert.

January 12, 1942.

SECRETMEMORANDUM

TO: John C. Wiley
 FROM: Maurice Halperin
 SUBJECT: Discussion with Monsieur Frans Van Cauwelaert
 concerning the Catholic problem in Latin
 America.

According to Colonel Donovan's request, transmitted by Mr. James, I went to see Monsieur Van Cauwelaert at the Belgian Embassy, at 10:00 A.M., January 9, 1942. Our conversation (in French for the convenience of Monsieur Van Cauwelaert) lasted about two hours.

I. Sinarquismo.

I permitted Monsieur Van Cauwelaert to read the memorandum of January 2 on "The Sinarquista Movement in Mexico" and then showed him the series of maps on the same subject. Monsieur Van Cauwelaert declared that both the memorandum and the maps were extremely useful in understanding the movement, and indicated that it was also his firm conviction that Sinarquismo at the

- 2 -

present time is manipulated by the Axis and constitutes a serious danger to the United States.

He asked me: "In fighting this danger, which would be preferable: an open attack by the United States against Sinarquismo, or efforts to dominate it from within?" I answered that the latter method would be preferable, if it could work. To this he agreed, and in turn, suggested the following reasons for avoiding an open attack:

- 1) A large majority of the Sinarquistas, though simple-minded or ignorant, are sincere and unaware of the ulterior motives of their leaders.
- 2) Hence, if an open attack against their movement took place, they might easily be persuaded by Axis propaganda that it was additional proof of the evil intentions of "Yankee imperialism".
- 3) An open attack would also strengthen their suspicions against the "Protestant-Masonic-Jewish menace" from the United States.

He suggested that two methods might be used simultaneously in working within the organization:

1) A propaganda appeal by pro-democratic Catholics, Mexican and foreign, on a purely Catholic basis; i.e., an attack against Hitlerism and all its manifestations within the Sinarquist ranks, based on sound existing Catholic doctrine;

2) Setting up internal friction among the leaders, which might result either in the disintegration of the organization or in the complete change of its character and aims. In either case, the chief purpose would be accomplished.

At the same time he stressed the urgency of quick action in order to neutralize or destroy this movement.

In discussing the effectiveness of a purely Catholic anti-Nazi propaganda, I asked his opinion concerning the necessity of convincing Mexican Catholics that for the present time, in the interests of the major struggle against Hitler, they should declare a truce with their traditional domestic enemies, trade unions, the liberals, and other anti-clerical elements. Monsieur Van Cauwelaert indicated that this would be difficult, but he agreed that it was absolutely essential for any effective alignment of Catholic elements in favor of the democracies.

I asked Monsieur Van Cauwelaert whether he had thought of a concrete plan of action as far as Sinarquismo was concerned. He answered that he had in mind only the general approach to the problem, and further suggested that there were a small number of Mexican priests and lay Catholics who could be enlisted in this task and who might be given assistance by foreign Catholics, in particular Belgian priests.

II. Latin America.

Monsieur Van Cauwelaert stated that the Sinarquista problem was not limited to Mexico alone, but concerned the whole continent. Each country, he said, had Catholic movements whose present political orientations were dangerous for the democratic cause. For example, he was of the opinion that the Catholic elements of Peru would be especially difficult to manage. In other countries, he discovered that there were influential Catholics who are disposed to work for the democratic cause. Monsieur Van Cauwelaert considers it to be essential that a "Front Catholique Unique" or unified Catholic front, embracing as many Catholic groups and elements as possible, be formed for all Latin America and that this "front" proceed on the basis of a purely Catholic propaganda; that is to say, it

would:

- 1) Match the social mysticism of the pro-Fascist groups;
- 2) Point out the loss of national independence and the persecution of Catholics in the occupied countries of Europe; and
- 3) Attack the Nazi menace on the basis of already-existing church doctrine, papal encyclicals and official Catholic condemnation of Nazi race theories.

Monsieur Van Cauwelaert did not have at hand the names of the numerous Catholics who, in his opinion, might help with this task. However, he did recall a few individuals. He mentioned Father Cardoso, a Jesuit priest in Mexico; Professor Amans de Lima, professor of literature at the Catholic Faculty in Rio de Janeiro; and Father Dossogne, a Jesuit in New Orleans.

He made special reference to a Dominican priest, de Rooy, in whom he has the utmost confidence and whom he considers a specialist on totalitarian doctrine and methods. Father de Rooy, a Belgian refugee, is at present in Johannesburg, South Africa. He has applied for an American visa but, despite the personal recommendation of Monsieur Van Cauwelaert, has thus far

been unable to secure admission into this country. Monsieur Van Cauwelaert states, in this connection, that when he approached the Provincial Superior of the Dominican Order in New York on behalf of Father de Rooy, he was rebuffed in the sharpest terms. From Monsieur Van Cauwelaert's comments, I gather that the above-mentioned Provincial Superior is possibly a strong "isolationist" and has had something to do with preventing Father de Rooy's entry into the United States.

Finally, Monsieur Van Cauwelaert declared that in his opinion Belgian priests would be particularly effective in conducting pro-democratic activities in Latin America because a number of leading Latin American priests have been educated in Belgium and because Belgium is considered to be a strong Catholic country, relatively uncontaminated by un-orthodox liberal movements.

French Catholics, on the other hand, are sometimes handicapped for this reason, but in some circles they enjoy high prestige. When I suggested the name of Jacques Maritain, distinguished French Catholic philosopher, Monsieur Van Cauwelaert said that he would be effective in a few large centers such as Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago de Chile, but that in more conservative

- 7 -

centers he would probably not be appreciated because of his anti-Franco position during the Spanish Civil War.

III. Conclusions.

Monsieur Van Cauwelaert appears to have a realistic grasp of the Catholic problem in Latin America. His own position as a prominent Belgian Catholic, his long identification with the democratic cause, his recent tour of Latin America and his experience with totalitarian Catholic movements in Europe would seem to qualify him as an expert in the problem under consideration.

From my own recent experience in Mexico, I would suggest that we cooperate with Monsieur Van Cauwelaert in dealing with Sinarquismo, at least to the extent of preparing with him a practical plan of action. In this connection, I would also suggest the need of prompt action and of discreet collaboration between Monsieur Van Cauwelaert and representatives of radical Mexican elements in working out a program of domestic truce within Mexico. I believe that non-Catholic Mexican leaders would be willing to discuss such a possibility.

~~Most Secret~~

Cole Donovan

Interesting!

John

FROM: JOHN C. WILBY

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Gaudens Megaro
 TO: Mr. John C. Wiley
 SUBJECT: DuPont's plan for an insurrection in Sardinia.

DATE January 17, 1942

In addition to my memorandum dated January 8, I wish to state the following:

DuPont's plan was prepared under conditions which do not prevail now; but as there appears to be no doubt that he is an extremely able man and is eager to carry out the essential aim of his plan, it would seem desirable that we get in touch with him in one of the following ways:


1. Send one of our men to Lisbon to talk with him;
2. Instruct one of our men or a representative of another branch of our Government now in Lisbon or Europe to talk with him;
3. To ask him to come here for consultation.

It would be a pity if DuPont's services could not be utilized in some way.

I think DuPont can still be reached, care of Unitarian Committee, Lisbon.

Now in this country is Dino Giacobbe, a close friend of DuPont. It might be worthwhile to see Giacobbe.

Gaudens Megaro



JAN 7 1942

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMOMOST SECRETFROM: John C. Wiley
TO: Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT: OTTO STRASSER

DATE January 8, 1942

The only new thing on Strasser is that he has petitioned the State Department to sign the declaration of the United Nations. Mr. Hoskins told me yesterday that, while it had been decided that Otto Strasser should not be allowed to sign, it had been more or less agreed upon that both Davila and Eckhardt should be permitted to affix their signatures. Following my conversation with you last evening, I telephoned Jimmie Dunn, who manifestly had the same reaction to this that we had. He stated with considerable energy that he would dig into the matter this morning.

At the conclusion of the attached memorandum reference is made to Otto Strasser's alleged radio station. Has anything been found out about this?



MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. John C. Wiley

January 6, 1942

From: J. R. Murphy

Colonel Donovan would like to know what
is new on the attached.


J. R. M.

Attachment

11/20/41
J. H. 27

MOST SECRET

December 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

A German-Jewish informant whom I have known for many years reports the following:

A strong hint has reached ~~me~~ that the whole Otto Strasser drive is a continuation of old British tactics which originated in London, to prepare Rauschnig, Bruening and Strasser as leaders of an anti-Nazi German movement-in-exile. Since Rauschnig is, for the time being, in the British doghouse, Strasser has now been given the green light to proceed as "leader" of the scheme. At the same time Strasser is playing with certain Catholic elements and has been prevailed upon to refrain from pressing his Socialist convictions and aims openly.

I am having the foregoing checked.

There seems to be some division within the British as to Otto Strasser. A high British official recently suggested to me most confidentially that it would be desirable for us to monitor Strasser's radio station in Canada, and

- 2 -

to pay attention not only to Strasser but to one Matthias who is also heard on the air from time to time. So far as I know, this is the first indication we have had that Otto Strasser possessed a radio station in Canada. (I passed the foregoing on to Nelson Poynter.)



John C. Wiley.

TO COLONEL CONOVAN ..

For his information.

File

November 13, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

NOV 14 1941

Mr. Norton, Mr. Wiley and Mr. Peole called on Mr. J. Edgar Hoover at the Department of Justice this afternoon and informed him of the general plans for the organization of the Division of Foreign Nationalities.

Mr. Hoover promised fullest cooperation on the part of the F. B. I. and said that within the next few days he would designate a member of his staff to act as liaison.

Dwight G. Peole.

November 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE: Conversation among Messrs. John S. Wiley, James F. Baxter, Devitt C. Poole, L.M.G. Smith and Keith Kane.

Mr. Wiley, Dr. Baxter and Mr. Poole met this morning at the Department of Justice with Mr. L.M.G. Smith and Mr. Keith Kane to discuss the monitoring of foreign language press published in the United States.

Mr. Smith and Mr. Kane explained that this work had been organized in the Department of Justice some time ago and was now being carried on with regard particularly to certain Federal statutes, for the enforcement of which the Department of Justice was responsible. Mr. Kane said that there are about 1700 foreign language newspapers and periodicals published in the United States in some 51 different languages. Of these, about 700 were being received by the Department of Justice and were being read by a staff of some 20 persons who commanded among them between 25 and 30 languages. It had taken some time to arrange for the receipt of this large number of periodicals; some of them were quite difficult to be had.

Mr. Kane remarked, incidentally, that in addition to the 1700 foreign language publications, some 200 newspapers and periodicals connected with foreign language groups were published in English. He said, also, that the Office of Government Reports subscribes to 350 English language newspapers and has them read with a view to certain specific objectives.

In the discussion among Messrs. Smith, Kane, Baxter, Wiley and Poole there seemed to be a general agreement that the monitoring of the foreign language press had best continue to be administered by the Department of Justice, but Mr. Smith and Mr. Kane indicated a readiness to recommend to the Attorney General that an arrangement be entered into with C.O.I. whereby C.O.I. would have a part in the direction of the work in question and in determining the line of investigation which should be followed. The specific suggestions were that C.O.I. should make a budgetary contribution to the cost of monitoring; that the administrative head of the bureau should be an employee of the Department of Justice and responsible to that department, but instructed to cooperate in the fullest measure with C.O.I.; that an inter-departmental board should be established which would decide upon the policy and character of the work to be done from time to time; and that the appropriate personnel of the new Division of Foreign Nationalities in C.O.I. should have access to the records and files of the monitoring bureau and, if desired, the liaison officer of C.O.I. should have a desk there.

- 2 -

The possibility was discussed of other departments and agencies, such as the War Department and Department of the Navy, desiring also to have some part in the reading of the foreign language press, and it was agreed in a general way that arrangements should be made so as to accommodate these additional participants should that be desired.

The Messrs. Smith and Kane said that they would confer with the Attorney General regarding the foregoing and the gentleman from C.O.I. said that they would consult with the budgetary officer to see what financial contribution might be made.

DeWitt C. Poole.

TO:

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE

TIME

PLACE

PARTICIPANTS

SUBJECT

ATTACHED

TO

FROM

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

PLACE

SUBJECT

DATE

TIME

Patill pro-Fascist. English born, age 35.

... is relatively ineffective.

on the other hand,

Enormous

can accomplish much.

There is no dispute.

Italy from

to the opposition view.

Agon and anophthalmus

Cumulative for 30

Professor Salvendy

over the short wave radio.

had the system under review.

political organization

each day until

States and by mail to the

democracy could be...

Professor Silverman

Shortwave

and he emphasized that

Given more radio

than in 800,000 radio tube than they are

much smaller than the original.

populations:

100

10-10-68

[illegible]

[The following page contains extremely faint, illegible markings.]

Declassified and Approved For Release 201

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100210003-8

不

As to Italy, I am one of those who believe that
country, Professor Salvemini said that if we
could be trusted as far as Italy, we could
not violence over a period of years, and Salza was a
leader. He felt that just Salza's idea were impossible.
any other Italian who might be chosen, even if he had
quality was a weakness that he would have as his ally.
Roman or Italians who are not available as leaders, such
Racchiardi recently arrived, called on me but looked at
public standing. Furthermore, he felt that Racchiardi had
mistake on his arrival in this country in intimating that
he would raise an Italian Legion, since there are very few
Italians of a military age in this country, and obviously the
United States cannot allow separate legions to be formed.

constituted

competing of America


the conclusion of the

action at the end of the

this whole problem

would be clear to the

in case he felt that



WCH

WCH/11/11/11

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100210003-8

to a rest, but was

you would have

of the British.

At the time, it

said that he was

a statement about the

a statement could be

was made once

the first world war

that work would be

citizen, found in the

their racial group and

specific solutions as

the same time, he

born citizens of Italian

immediate way to affect

to leaders in of an

relationships had certain

power, though not of the

and no doubt, if marshal

would not without royal

of the Duke of Aosta

Army

He was a loyal, ardent

Crown Prince, to be a

to the leadership

United States, in

take to the point of

to the Department of

within Italy, and

has been an

circumstances of

to allow the "Free

country since there seemed to be no

Sforza available. It did not

his judgment was based on information

others.

Mr. Phillips brought up for

his sending back to Count

officials when they leave, a

could carry his personal regrets

necessary to declare war on the

though he could bring into this

had had talks with the President

declaration of war on the United

the fact that the United States

Government has a great

deal of sympathy for
in this letter and
will be in the winter
since in the
these events in the letter
Mr. Williams wished
letter to officials in the
him to Boston if the idea of
so that he could proceed with the
wished to show it was not
the draft of such a letter, in
January 6, since he must be
take a speech.

1-5/1 - JET:GW

file

January 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MURPHY:

Mr. Richard Rohman (Amalgamated Garment Workers) will bring Colonel Pacciardi to the St. Regis at 4:00 tomorrow - Wednesday. Colonel Pacciardi will ask for you and Mr. Rohman understands that Colonel Pacciardi is to see Colonel Donovan alone.

John C. Wiley
John C. Wiley.

MOST SECRET

January 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL POWAN:

Count Sforza called this morning. The major point which he has in mind, and very energetically, is to get hold of IL PROGRESSO. One Giovanola, "an honest man", is, according to Sforza, the anti-Fascist alibi in the otherwise Fascist organ of Generoso Pope. Pope has approached Giovanola in order to ascertain how he can make his peace with Count Sforza, and the latter believes, from what Giovanola tells him, that Pope has read the writing on the wall and that it would require little or no pressure for the editorial side of the paper to be re-staffed with his, Count Sforza's men. In other words, the paper would be turned into a Sforza organ. He feels that he could accomplish two things:

- (1) He could rehabilitate Pope provided the latter came to him as on a voyage to Canossa; and
- (2) He could work on Catholic public opinion in the United States, which he describes as most dangerous to the common cause.

Count Sforza denies that through official or other direct action the Vatican can be influenced by the United States.

- 2 -

The Vatican, he claims, is a mirror which projects the reflection of what it receives. Through a vigorous campaign by IL PROGRESSO, Italian priests can be influenced; and when the priests are influenced, the bishops can be influenced, and finally, the Vatican.

Count Sforza confided to me, with some reluctance, that he or rather the Mazzini Society has been receiving some \$500 a month from the British. It further appears that Count Sforza has been in touch with a Mr. Colt (?) whom he described as head of British Intelligence.

Count Sforza expressed repugnance that he should have to be in touch with members of an intelligence service, whose function in life was that of corrupting others. In the past he had been in contact with Lord Stonehaven with whom he could talk as one equal to another. Through him he maintained contact with Mr. Churchill. Unfortunately, Lord Stonehaven died two months ago. Before Mr. Churchill's departure from the United States, Count Sforza, recalling his twenty-year-old acquaintance with him, telegraphed urgently for an appointment. He received a polite refusal and a suggestion that he, Count Sforza, get in touch with Lord Halifax. Count

- 2 -


Sforza refuses to do this. He describes Lord Halifax as a timid and conservative man who, as Ambassador to the United States, acts only as a meek Charge d'Affaires.

Count Sforza paid the highest eulogies to Pacciardi whose honesty he underlined. However, if an Italian Legion was formed under Colonel Pacciardi it should be under theegis of Count Sforza and a national committee; otherwise the Italian mind would immediately jump to the conclusion that Pacciardi was merely a dollar mercenary. He went on that he, Count Sforza, might not be loved in Italy and might not have a great following, yet everyone in Italy knew that he could not be bought by dollars. Moreover, a committee headed by Count Sforza would involve no official recognition by the United States and American support of such a committee could be withdrawn at any time.

In talking to Count Sforza, I referred to his recent statement of the inability of democracies to reach decisions and the danger of such delays. I recalled to Count Sforza that the United States had been in a state of war only since December 7; that vital decisions affecting the conduct of the war had complete precedence at this moment, and that

- 4 -

I hoped he would not be too impatient in pressing for replies to his very interesting suggestions.


John S. Wiley.

JCW:BJ

NOT SECRET

January 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:


Yesterday afternoon when I saw Mr. James Dunn at the Department of State, I informed him confidentially of the information received from Count Sforza, to the effect that he and the Mazzini Society had been receiving a subsidy of some \$500 a month which aided in the publication of their weekly organ, the ITALIA LIBERA. I mentioned the fact that the British, because of our entry into the war, had decided to discontinue this subsidy as of January 31st. It seemed inadvisable to leave the matter in a vacuum and I expressed the opinion that we ought to intimate to the British that the continuance of this subsidy through the month of February would give us time to study the question and reach some sort of a decision.

Mr. Dunn concurred and stated that he saw no reason why we should not approach the British in the matter.


This morning I telephoned Mr. Poole in New York and asked him to give a discreet message along the above-mentioned lines to Mr. Hall of the British Information Service with whom he was to lunch. Mr. Hall informed Mr. Poole that he would pass it on, and that I would get news regarding the status of things here in Washington. In the late afternoon, Captain B. Pleydell

- 2 -

Bouverie, assistant to Colonel Ellis, came to see me. He inquired what was desired. I replied that we understood, quite confidentially, that his people had been of some assistance to Count Sforza and the Mazzini Society and that, for certain reasons, it had been decided to terminate this assistance as of the end of January. I repeated to him that since our entry into the war was so recent, there were a great many questions which as yet had not received consideration. I therefore hoped that the termination of the assistance to Count Sforza and the Mazzini Society would be postponed until the end of February in order to give us time to reach an appropriate decision. Captain Bouverie replied that his people would be only too happy to acquiesce and explained that such questions were in the hands of a Mr. Halpern.. Mr. Halpern was originally Russian and had been the lawyer of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg. Before the last war he was admitted to British citizenship and was now in New York handling questions involving a great number of countries, ranging from southern to eastern Europe. He suggested that it might be mutually helpful if I would establish personal contact with Mr. Halpern. I replied that I would be delighted to see him whenever he happened to be in Washington.


John C. Wiley.

JCW:BJ Copy to Col. Donovan.



January 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

Mr. Tibor Eckhardt called this morning on Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole. Much of the time was consumed in general conversation. The principal statements made by Mr. Eckhardt were these:

He left Hungary last March, at the instigation particularly of the American Minister, Mr. John Montgomery. At that time it was not necessary to have an exit permit in order to quit Hungary, but German Gestapo agents endeavored, unsuccessfully, to prevent his departure from Budapest. He travelled by way of Athens, Cairo, and Capetown to the United States, where he arrived in April.

On his arrival in the United States he found that a good deal of public agitation had already occurred with respect to the Hungarian situation. Mr. Eckhardt attributed this to machinations by the Czechoslovaks. He mentioned a man named Schultz as the man out in front. He did not know those who were behind him. Schultz pretended to be a Hungarian but he was not so in fact.

Mr. Eckhardt said that he had himself done or said nothing publicly until he had talked with Mr. Sumner Welles at the Department of State. It continued to be his policy to avoid joining issue with those who attacked

- 2 -

him. He was determined that there should not be any public controversy so far as he could prevent it.

Mr. Eckhardt said that he would send to Mr. Wiley certain statements of his views and aspirations regarding Hungary and an eventual solution of the whole Central European problem. Mr. Wiley assured Mr. Eckhardt that he wished to be in the friendliest contact with him and suggested that Mr. Eckhardt might take lunch with him informally within the near future.

Mr. Eckhardt volunteered the statement that he was himself not necessarily monarchist. He would not oppose some republican form of government for Hungary in case that in time appeared to be best. The relations of Hungary with Czechoslovakia, he said, had been made difficult principally by the unyielding attitude of Dr. Benes. These relations could have been brought on to a friendly basis by a small rectification of the frontier. President Masaryk had indicated his readiness to discuss the matter, but Benes was always obdurate.

Benes, in Mr. Eckhardt's opinion, was "a small school teacher". He was obsessed with the purpose of destroying the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Destruction of this empire had not been Mr. Eckhardt's purpose, but rather its reconstruction in its traditional role. He thought that Jan Masaryk was not as difficult as Benes, but Benes was the master.


- 3 -

Toward Dr. Hodza Mr. Eckhardt manifested a friendly attitude. He thought that much could have been saved if Hodza had been Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia at the right time. He did not doubt that relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia could be worked out in the future if Hodza were the spokesman of the latter country. Asked about Hodza's political following, Mr. Eckhardt said that he undoubtedly had a strong following in Slovakia, but little or none in the Czech regions.

In a general way Mr. Eckhardt concurred in Hodza's conception of a Central European Federation. He thought, however, that Hodza was too ambitious in speaking of a federation which would extend from the Baltic to the Aegean.

In Mr. Eckhardt's mind the central European region fell into three parts. North of the Carpathians was the Polish-Baltic region. To the south was the Balkan region; in between, the Danubian. If a federation could be brought about within each of these areas, then these three federations might in time be drawn together by preferential tariffs.

Asked whether he considered Rumania to belong to the Danubian region, he said that it did geographically, but culturally, being Byzantine, it belonged to the Balkan region.



John C. Wiley.


TO:

MR. MURPHY

1-18-42

Dear Jim:

I would be most obliged if
you would attach the memorandum
of January 7 on Coast Forces and
IL PROGRAM, as well as my memo-
randum of January 18 -- sent over
Saturday -- on the subject of
Spiecker, Solms and the
STAATSTZEITUNG.



FROM: JOHN C. WILEY

January 19, 1942

MOST SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DOLOVAN:COUNT SFORZA and IL PROGRESSO

In view of Count Sforza's impending arrival here and the intensive political activity among Italian groups in this country since our entry into the war, I venture to urge that the decisions outlined in my memorandum to you of January 7, 1942, be presented to the highest possible echelon for appropriate directives. We should determine what our attitude is to be towards Count Sforza, other Italian groups, Colonel Paociardi and, finally, the Italian foreign-language press. A question calling for decision with greatest urgency is: Is this Government in time of war prepared to subsidize individuals and newspapers from secret funds? For example, we have Count Sforza committed, in writing, to the effect that he would like a secret subsidy from this Government. Sforza is entirely too powerful to be disregarded or shunted to one side. There are, at the same time, valid reasons why he should be prevented from assuming a more or less de jure role as the official

- 2 -

spokesman for any free Italian movement. By avoiding official recognition, but giving him pecuniary support on a month-to-month basis, we might strike a happy medium and simultaneously keep him both happy and under control.

It seems equally urgent to reach, at the same time, a decision in respect of the Italian press, beginning with Generoso Pope and IL PROGRESSO. Pope is reliably reported to be sufficiently worried about his status -- as well as that of his paper -- that he might be maneuvered into giving up editorial control. IL PROGRESSO, properly re-staffed and with a suitable editorial policy, would be an invaluable instrument for the home front (which is not our business) and foreign propaganda (which is our business). Moreover, the IL PROGRESSO would be of interest to the Foreign Nationalities Branch.

The STAATSZEITUNG

In my memorandum to you of January 16, 1942, relative to Mr. Ridder and the STAATSZEITUNG, I set forth the parallel situation with respect to Germany. It would seem urgently advisable for a decision to be reached in regard to the re-staffing of this oldest and best known organ of the German language press in the United States. Mr. Ridder is reliably

- 3 -


reported to have seen the writing on the wall and to be willing to re-staff his paper.

The ex-German Consul, Dr. Schwartz, claims to have "full powers" from Mr. Ridder and made it clear that he has Dr. Spiecker in mind as editor-in-chief. The latter, although he has considerable British support, is suspected of being available to the German generals as an accomplice in any peace move that may be made in this country.

Clearly, in any re-staffing of the STAATSZEITUNG, the personnel should be most carefully studied in order to make an extremely powerful and reliable propaganda weapon out of the paper. Also, it would be a powerful agency for morale on the home front.

The need of a subsidy for the STAATSZEITUNG is explained by the fact that advertising has dropped off and circulation has been reduced by our entry into the war. Dr. Schwartz estimated that \$250 to \$300 a week would be required.

I venture to suggest that the important questions of principle and policy outlined above should receive prompt consideration.


John C. Wiley.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

A very highly placed Brazilian informant, believed to be entirely reliable, states, in substance, the following:

The Germans are doing amazing things in Brazil and there are evidences of their clever tactics here in the U.S. For example: Vargas has been ignored in the American press and Aranha played up. No reference was made of Vargas' speech at the Rio conference. This is designed to give the impression of rivalry between the two.

Aranha has no following in Brazil and is entirely without authority even in the Foreign Office. Vargas' son is about to arrive in the U. S. It will be most unfortunate for him to find this situation here. Too, Goes Monteros detest Aranha, who is kept in office by Vargas with great difficulty and on a basis of personal friendship alone. The present publicity campaign playing up Aranha will be greatly irritating to Goes.

The informant was recently interviewed by Emil Hurja and has become convinced that he is responsible

-2-

for the attitude of the American press. Evelyn Gordon,
the informant added, is probably mixed in.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

Personal

FROM: J. R. Hayden *JRH* ✓
 TO: Mr. John C. Wiley
 SUBJECT: Memorandum "On Peace Offensives"

DATE January 14, 1942

The suggestion made in this memorandum that we should bring our political imagination to focus on a series of peace drives is, I think, a good one.

A number of people who are familiar with the situation in China have read the memorandum. Their opinions differ as to the validity of the hypothesis that Chinese resistance to Japan may collapse in the near future. The weight of opinion, however, seems to be that this will not happen. My own opinion is that the "disappearance" of Chiang Kai-Shek as the effective leader of Nationalist China is extremely improbable. It does not seem to me likely that under conditions which now exist that Japan would offer to withdraw from China, south of the great wall.

As an example of "peace offensives" and the necessity of being on guard against them, this memorandum might well be passed on to Colonel Donovan.

December 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO JOHN WILEY: On Peace Offensives.

By B. C. H.

It must be our constant concern to anticipate the peace offensives as well as the military offensives of the Axis. This is all the more important because in the Wilsonian tradition America fights for principles and theories; we do not, as a nation, fight peoples. We dream of making peace with the German Army and people over the heads of the Nazis, with the Japanese people over the heads of the Army, etc. We are thus off guard, as unprepared for political as for military surprise attacks.

As one method of getting on the alert, I suggest the following type of Friedenspiel, based on interpretation of the present situation:

I. Japan.

(1) We may presume that in launching the war the Japanese government had reasons to expect eventual capture of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and Burma. In war potential such conquest would give Japan the rubber, the tin and the oil, as well as millions of natives to exploit as manpower. Japan would then be a relatively self-sufficient industrial empire.

(2) Such an outcome of this war recalls the Tani Memorial, 1887, and the long issue between the Southern Plan (Satsuma Clan, the Navy) and the Continental Plan (Chosu Clan, the Army). With fulfillment of the Southern Plan Japan could afford to evacuate all of China south of the Great Wall.

II. China.

(1) There seems to be a feeling of war-weariness in China, which is reflected amongst the local Chinese as a scarcely concealed expectancy of peace.

- 2 -

The Chinese are not satisfied with the aid and friendship extended by Britain and America. They have been in war for four and a half years, and have received but little direct help, whereas Soviet Russia rated lend-lease assistance within a few months.

(2) The Compradore psychosis of the Chinese is really stronger than the incipient devotion to far-off democracy. The Compradores want to get back to the abacus.

(3) The pro-Nazi, pro-Soviet, and even pro-Wang Ching Wei feeling in Chungking is much more pronounced than can be admitted in America.

III. Questions:

(1) If the peace offensive takes the form not of an offer from Hitler to Britain or to Russia, but of Japan to China, on condition of complete evacuation south of the Great Wall, what would be the reception in China?

(a) Chiang Kai Shek might disappear (Come to America? The appointment of T. V. Soong as Foreign Minister, while resident in Washington, has some significance; meanwhile the negotiations for coordinated war efforts were opened in Chungking, not in Washington: queer).

(b) China might split into two main sections, with Wang Ching Wei retaining the center and the north, while the Communists assume full control of the northwest (Kansu, Shensi, Sinkiang, etc.) and tie in closely with Soviet Russia. Other power centers might form at Canton and in Western China. China would thus return to Provincial parcellation and the Compradores would begin to make money again.

2

(2) If, having conquered southeast Asia and the islands before America got ready for an all-out war in the Western Pacific, Japan were to offer us peace on the basis of the open door for rubber and tin, quinine, etc., would we then continue to fight for the recovery of the Philippines, Singapore, and The Netherlands East Indies? That is, if the Chungking regime dissolves and China is partitioned amongst Chinese factions, with Russia neutral and sharing in the spoils, what would be America's war aims in the Far East.

This is to suggest that we should bring our political imagination to focus on a series of Friedensspiele of this type so as to be ready for all contingencies.

December 29, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO JOHN WILBY: IN POWER SITUATION

By B. G. H.

It must be our constant concern to anticipate the peace offensives as well as the military offensives of the Axis. This is all the more important because in the Wilsonian tradition America fights for principles and theories; we do not, as a nation, fight peoples. We dream of making peace with the German Army and people over the heads of the Axis, with the Japanese people over the heads of the Army, etc. We are thus off guard, as unprepared for political as for military surprise attacks.

As one method of getting on the alert, I suggest the following type of Prisoners, based on interpretation of the present situation:

I. Japan.

(1) We may presume that in launching the war the Japanese government had reasons to expect eventual capture of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and Burma. In war potential such conquest would give Japan the rubber, the tin and the oil, as well as millions of natives to exploit as manpower. Japan would then be a relatively self-sufficient industrial empire.

(2) Such an outcome of this war recalls the Tani Memorial, 1907, and the long issues between the Southern Plan (Kato's Plan, the Navy) and the Continental Plan (Grove's Plan, the Army). With fulfillment of the Southern Plan Japan could afford to evacuate all of China south of the Great Wall.

II. China.

(1) There seems to be a feeling of war-weariness in China, which is reflected amongst the local Chinese as a scarcely concealed expectancy of peace.

- 2 -

The Chinese are not satisfied with the aid and friendship extended by Britain and America. They have been in war for four and a half years, and have received but little direct help, whereas Soviet Russia voted loan-lease assistance within a few months.

(3) The Comrade psychosis of the Chinese is really stronger than the insipient devotion to far-off democracy. The Comrades want to get back to the abacus.

(4) The pro-Nazi, pro-Soviet, and even pro-Wang Ching Wei feeling in Chungking is much more pronounced than can be admitted in America.

III. Questions:

(1) If the peace offensive takes the form not of an offer from Hitler to Britain or to Russia, but of Japan to China, on condition of complete evacuation south of the Great Wall, what would be the reception in China?

(2) Chiang Kai Shek might disappear (Come to America? The appointment of T. V. Soong as Foreign Minister, while resident in Washington, has some significance; meanwhile the negotiations for coordinated war efforts were opened in Chungking, not in Washington; queer).

(b) China might split into two main sections, with Wang Ching Wei retaining the center and the north, while the Communists assume full control of the northwest (Kansu, Shensi, Sinkiang, etc.) and tie in closely with Soviet Russia. Other power centers might form at Canton and in Eastern China. China would then return to Provincial parcelation and the Comrades would begin to make money again.

- 2 -

(2) If, having conquered southeast Asia and the islands before America got ready for an all-out war in the Western Pacific, Japan were to offer us peace on the basis of the open door for rubber and tin, quinine, etc., would we then continue to fight for the recovery of the Philippines, Singapore, and The Netherlands East Indies? That is, if the Chungking regime dissolves and China is partitioned amongst Chinese factions, with Russia neutral and sharing in the spoils, what would be America's war aims in the Far East.

This is to suggest that we should bring our political imagination to focus on a series of Principals of this type so as to be ready for all contingencies.

December 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO JOHN WILEY: On Peace Offensive

By D. C. H.

It must be our constant concern to anticipate the peace offensive as well as the military offensive of the Axis. This is all the more important because in the Wilsonian tradition America fights for principles and theories; we do not, as a nation, fight peoples. We dream of making peace with the German Army and people over the heads of the Nazis, with the Japanese people over the heads of the Army, etc. We are thus off guard, as unprepared for political as for military surprise attacks.

As one method of getting on the alert, I suggest the following type of Prisoners based on interpretation of the present situation:

I. Japan.

(1) We may presume that in launching the war the Japanese government had reasons to expect eventual capture of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and Burma. In war potential such conquest would give Japan the rubber, the tin and the oil, as well as millions of natives to exploit as manpower. Japan would then be a relatively self-sufficient, industrial empire.

(2) Such an outcome of this war recalls the Tani Memorial, 1897, and the long issue between the Southern Plan (Satsuma Class, the Navy) and the Continental Plan (Chosen Class, the Army). With fulfillment of the Southern Plan Japan could afford to evacuate all of China south of the Great Wall.

II. China.

(1) There seems to be a feeling of war-weariness in China, which is reflected amongst the local Chinese as a scarcely concealed expectancy of peace.

- 2 -

The Chinese are not satisfied with the aid and friendship extended by Britain and America. They have been in war for four and a half years, and have received but little direct help, whereas Soviet Russia rated lend-lease assistance within a few months.

(2) The Comrade propaganda of the Chinese is really stronger than the implicit devotion to far-off democracy. The Comrades want to get back to the abacus.

(3) The pro-Nazi, pro-Soviet, and even pro-Wang Ching Wei feeling in Chungking is much more pronounced than can be admitted in America.

III. Questions:

(1) If the peace offensive takes the form not of an offer from Hitler to Britain or to Russia, but of Japan to China, on condition of complete evacuation south of the Great Wall, what would be the reception in China?

(a) Chiang Kai Shek might disappear (Come to America? The appointment of T. V. Soong as Foreign Minister, while resident in Washington, has some significance; meanwhile the negotiations for coordinated war efforts were opened in Chungking, not in Washington; queer).

(b) China might split into two main sections, with Wang Ching Wei retaining the center and the north, while the Communists assume full control of the northwest (Kansu, Shensi, Szechwan, etc.) and tie in closely with Soviet Russia. Other power centers might form at Canton and in Western China. China would thus return to Provincial parcellation and the Comrades would begin to make money again.

- 3 -

(2) If, having conquered southeast Asia and the islands before America got ready for an all-out war in the Western Pacific, Japan were to offer us peace on the basis of 'the open door for rubber and tin, quinine, etc., would we then continue to fight for the recovery of the Philippines, Singapore, and The Netherlands East Indies? That is, if the Chungking regime disintegrates and China is partitioned amongst Chinese factions, with America neutral and sharing in the spoils, what would be America's war aims in the Far East.

This is to suggest that we should bring our political imagination to focus on a series of Prismenials of this type so as to be ready for all contingencies.

December 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO JOHN WILBY: On Peace Offensive.

By H. C. K.

It must be our constant concern to anticipate the peace offensives as well as the military offensives of the Axis. This is all the more important because in the Wilsonian tradition America fights for principles and theories; we do not, as a nation, fight peoples. We dream of making peace with the German Army and people over the heads of the Nazis, with the Japanese people over the heads of the Army, etc. We are thus off guard, as unprepared for political as for military surprise attacks.

As one method of getting on the alert, I suggest the following type of Friedensspiel, based on interpretation of the present situation:

I. Japan.

(1) We may presume that in launching the war the Japanese government had reasons to expect eventual capture of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and Burma. In war potential such conquest would give Japan the rubber, the tin and the oil, as well as millions of natives to exploit as manpower. Japan would then be a relatively self-sufficient, industrial empire.

(2) Such an outcome of this war recalls the Tani Memorial, 1897, and the long issue between the Southern Plan (Satsuma Clan, the Navy) and the Continental Plan (Chosen Clan, the Army). With fulfillment of the Southern Plan Japan could afford to evacuate all of China south of the Great Wall.

II. China.

(1) There seems to be a feeling of war-weariness in China, which is reflected amongst the local Chinese as a scarcely concealed expectancy of peace.

- 11 -

The Chinese are not satisfied with the aid and friendship extended by Britain and America. They have been in war for four and a half years, and have received but little direct help, whereas Soviet Russia voted lend-lease assistance within a few months.

(2) The Comrade psychosis of the Chinese is really stronger than the incipient devotion to far-off democracy. The Comrades want to get back to the atom.

(3) The pro-Nazi, pro-Soviet, and even pro-Hung Chiang Wei feeling in Chungking is much more pronounced than can be admitted in America.

III. Questions:

(1) If the peace offensive takes the form not of an offer from Hitler to Britain or to Russia, but of Japan to China, on condition of complete evacuation south of the Great Wall, what would be the reception in China?

(a) Chiang Kai Shek might disappear (Come to America? The appointment of T. V. Soong as Foreign Minister, while resident in Washington, has some significance; meanwhile the negotiations for coordinated war efforts were opened in Chungking, not in Washington; queer).

(b) China might split into two main sections, with Wang (Chiang Wei) retaining the center and the north, while the Communists assume full control of the northwest (Shensi, Shensi, Sinkiang, etc.) and tie in closely with Soviet Russia. Other power centers might form at Canton and in Western China. China would thus return to Provincial parcellation and the Comrades would begin to make money again.

- 3 -

(B) If, having conquered southeast Asia and the islands before America got ready for an all-out war in the Western Pacific, Japan were to offer us peace on the basis of the open door for rubber and tin, quinine, etc., would we then continue to fight for the recovery of the Philippines, Singapore, and The Netherlands East Indies? That is, if the Chungking regime dissolves and China is partitioned amongst Chinese factions, with Japan neutral and sharing in the spoils, what would be America's war aims in the Far East.

This is to suggest that we should bring our political imagination to focus on a series of hypotheticals of this type so as to be ready for all contingencies.